



PSD2: Dopady na bankovní a fintech sektor
Diplomová práce
Vedoucí diplomové práce: JUDr. Tereza Kunertová, LL.M., Ph.D.
Katedra evropského práva




PSD2: The Implications for Banking and the 
Fintech Industry
Master’s Thesis
Master’s thesis supervisor: JUDr. Tereza Kunertová, LL.M., Ph.D.
Department of European Union law
Date of completion (manuscript closure): 03.09.2018
Prohlášení
Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou diplomovou práci vypracoval samostatně, že všechny použité 
zdroje byly řádně uvedeny a že práce nebyla využita k získání jiného nebo stejného titulu.
Dále prohlašuji, že vlastní text této práce včetně poznámek pod čarou má 201.612 znaků včetně 
mezer. 
Ondřej Dolenský
V Praze dne 3. září 2018
Declaration
I hereby declare that this master’s thesis represents my own work and all the sources used for 
this master‘s thesis have been duly acknowledged and cited. I declare that this master´s thesis 
has not been used to achieve this or any other academic degree. 
I also declare that the character count of the body of the submitted master´s thesis, including 
footnotes, is 201,612. 
Ondřej Dolenský
In Prague on 3 September 2018
Poděkování
V prvé řadě bych rád poděkoval JUDr. Tereze Kunertové, LL.M., Ph.D. za její trpělivost, čas, 
konstruktivní připomínky a flexibilitu. Zároveň bych rád vyjádřil poděkování svým rodičům za 
jejich  neustávající  podporu  během  mých  studií.  V  neposlední  řadě  bych  rád  vyjádřil  svoji 
vděčnost Aditovi Magudia za jeho podnětné připomínky a jazykovou korekturu. 
Acknowledgement
First and foremost, I would like to thank JUDr. Tereza Kunertová, LL.M., Ph.D. for her patience, 
time, constructive comments and flexibility. I would also like to express my thanks to my parents 
for their continued support during my studies. Last but not least, I would like to express my 
gratitude to Adit Magudia for his critical comments and proof-read of this thesis. 
Obsah / Table of Contents
1. Introduction.........................................................................................................................- 1 -
1.1. Main objectives................................................................................................................- 2 -
1.2. Content.............................................................................................................................- 3 -
1.3. Methodology....................................................................................................................- 3 -
2. A Primer on Banking and Fintech Industry.........................................................................- 4 -
2.1. Banking system and the recent problems.........................................................................- 4 -
2.1.1. Fundamentals of banking regulation in the European Union.......................................- 5 -
2.1.2. The Global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the impacts on banking........................- 8 -
2.1.3. The aftermath of the Global financial crisis and the subsequent regulation..............- 11 -
2.2. Fintech Industry and how has it evolved.......................................................................- 15 -
2.2.1. The evolution of Fintech and the consequences of the Global financial crisis..........- 17 -
2.2.2. Medialization of the Fintech Industry and the contemporary situation......................- 18 -
2.2.3. Regulation of the Fintech Industry.............................................................................- 20 -
3. Payment Services Directive(s) – the foundations and key changes..................................- 26 -
3.1. The basic overview of the payment system under EU law............................................- 26 -
3.2. The original Payment Services Directive (PSD)............................................................- 29 -
3.2.1. Rationale behind adoption of the PSD.......................................................................- 30 -
3.2.2. Main provisions regarding payment services of the PSD..........................................- 30 -
3.2.3. Relevant case-law of the CJEU relating to the PSD..................................................- 38 -
3.2.4. Evaluation of the PSD followed by a decision to adopt a new directive...................- 41 -
3.3. The revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2)..........................................................- 44 -
3.3.1. The scope of the PSD2 and exclusions from applicability of the PSD2....................- 45 -
3.3.2. Payment Initiation Service.........................................................................................- 49 -
3.3.3. Account Information Service.....................................................................................- 52 -
3.3.4. Security measures under the PSD2............................................................................- 56 -
3.3.5. Enhanced consumer protection..................................................................................- 58 -
3.3.6. The role of the EBA...................................................................................................- 59 -
4. Revolution or gradual evolution for the Fintech Industry and bright prospects?..............- 62 -
4.1. Assessment of the changes coming along with the PSD2 for the whole banking and 
Fintech industry........................................................................................................................- 62 -
4.2. Is there a bright future for the Fintech Industry?...........................................................- 64 -
5. Conclusion.........................................................................................................................- 68 -
List of abbreviations / Seznam zkratek............................................................................................I
Bibliography / Seznam použitých zdrojů........................................................................................II
Abstrakt (ČJ)..............................................................................................................................XIX
Abstract (EN)...............................................................................................................................XX
“Banking is necessary, banks are not.”1
1. Introduction
Modern technology is changing the ways how we communicate, study, work and also 
manage our finances. Even though it may be hard for us to grasp the rapid growth of modern 
technology  and we may have a  hard  time  using  this  technology,  regulators  face  even more 
difficult task. With respect to modern technology, regulators were entrusted with the power and 
task to lay down a legal framework that would properly reflect the development and protect the 
relevant stakeholders, while, at the same time, they should be promoting competition and further 
advancements. Despite their best efforts to set up an appropriate framework and keep up with the 
need of the technological developments, it is often argued that they are always one step behind, 
especially when it comes to financial regulation of banking.2
That  being  said,  new  legislation  focusing  (even  marginally)  on  modern  technology 
usually comes with high expectations from the wide public that these measures may promote the 
development  of  modern  technology  and ensure  a  competitive  level  playing field  among the 
current  market  participants  and  “new  players”  entering  the  market.  Nevertheless,  these 
expectations influenced by the media coverage may escalate into a situation in which it is unclear 
whether the expectations are well-founded or greatly exaggerated. Examples of these situations 
can be seen in recent publicity connected with the adoption of the GDPR3 and the PSD24. As will 
be demonstrated further in this thesis, many commentators expect that the PSD2 will reshape the 
banking industry and trigger further changes encouraging the growth of the Fintech industry.
Following the above-mentioned considerations, I have decided to ascertain whether PSD2 
is capable of the predicted effects on the banking industry, i.e. whether the prediction regarding 
1  Richard Kovacevich. See e.g. ‘Is This Guy The Best Banker In America?’, Fortune (6 July 1998), available at: 
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/07/06/244842/index.htm, last accessed 20. 
August 2018. This statement is sometimes wrongly attributed to Bill Gates. Instead, Bill Gates said: “Banks 
are  dinosaurs,  we  can  bypass  them.”  See  ‘Culture  Club’,  Newsweek  (7  November  1994),  available  at: 
https://www.newsweek.com/culture-club-189982,  last  accessed  20  August  2018.  The  most  interesting  fact 
about these statements is that they were articulated as early as in 1998 and 1994, respectively.
2  See e.g. ‘Banking in the digital age: the failure of financial regulation’ (20 January 2015), The Guardian, 
available  at:  https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/jan/20/finance-in-digital-age-while-
regulation-stuck-in-industrial, last accessed 25 August 2018.
3  Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment 
services  in  the  internal  market,  amending  Directives  2002/65/EC,  2009/110/EC  and  2013/36/EU  and 
Regulation (EU) No.  1093/2010,  and repealing  Directive  2007/64/EC [2015]  OJ L 337/35 (23 December 
2015).
4  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection  
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1 (4 May 2016).
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fate of banks quoted in the heading of this chapter may come true. Given my interest in modern 
technology and EU law, I decided to focus my thesis on the topic of the PSD2 and particularly 
on the possible benefits of the PSD2 for the growing Fintech industry.
1.1. Main objectives
Accordingly, one of the main objectives is to highlight the differences between the PSD5 
and the PSD2, which would reveal the extent and complexity of changes the PSD2 is bringing 
about. In order to do that, it will be necessary to ascertain the position of the PSD and PSD2 
within the framework forming the regulation of the payment systems at the EU level. 
Further, this thesis will focus on the current regulation of banks in view of the fact that 
the regulation has strengthened following the Global financial crisis. As a result, one of the goals 
is  to  present  an  overview  containing  regulation  of  the  banking  industry,  which  will  be 
subsequently compared with regulation of the Fintech industry.
Subsequently, the differences between the PSD and the PSD2 will be evaluated in the 
context of different levels of regulation of the banking and the Fintech industry. The aim will be 
to point out the possible direction of the development of these industries in connection with 
adoption of the PSD2. Therefore, one of the main objectives of this thesis is to provide a possible 
answer to the following question: Are the changes coming along with the introduction of the new 
directive  on  payment  services  combined  with  other  novelties  (such  as  Fintech)  capable  of 
disrupting the current banking system as we know it?
Given that the topic concerning modern technology and the financial regulation is very 
broad, the aim of this thesis is not to cover all the various regulations and trends relating to 
modern technology. Some of the topics, including crypto-currencies and various technological 
companies making use of the modern technology, will not be covered by this thesis. Therefore, 
this thesis should constitute an outline of the topic, which will focus mostly on the PSD2 and the 
Fintech industry. Since this area of law is still evolving, I would like to use this thesis as a basis 
for further research in the future and compare the outcomes of this thesis with the subsequent 
course of progress in this particular area of law together with the developments in the Fintech 
industry.
5 Directive (EC) 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment  
services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and 
repealing Directive 97/5/EC [2007] OJ L 319 (5 December 2007).
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1.2. Content
This  thesis  is  divided  into  five  chapters.  Following  this  brief  introductory  chapter, 
Chapter 2 will delve into the topic of banking and Fintech industry, which will mostly focus on 
the development and recent problems in these industries together with the respective regulation 
at the national and EU level. Then, Chapter 3 will provide an overview of the regulation of the 
payment  systems  at  the  EU level  which  will  be  followed  by  the  original  payment  services 
directive (i.e. the PSD) and the revised payment services directives (i.e. the PSD2) with the main 
features of these directives. Subsequently, the assessment of the changes coming along with the 
PSD2 and possible prospects for the development of the Fintech industry will be provided in 
Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 will summarise the outcomes of this thesis. 
1.3. Methodology 
In accordance with the main objectives specified above, this thesis will primarily use the 
descriptive  analysis  of  the  relevant  legislation  together  with  the  analysis  of  cases  that  are 
included in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Further, the descriptive analysis will be supplemented with 
the comparative method in Chapters 2 and 3, which will compare the relevant legislation. Given 
that the PSD2 has been adopted quite recently, the academic literature concerning this directive 
is relatively scarce. As a result, this thesis will mostly draw inspiration from articles submitted 
by academics  to  academic  journals.  These sources  will  be further  supplemented  with online 
resources and the case-law of the CJEU.
3
2. A Primer on Banking and Fintech Industry
Given that this thesis  is dedicated to the impacts of the revised directive on payment 
services (i.e. PSD2) and ensuing changes to banking and the Fintech industry, it is worthwhile to 
define these terms at the very outset of this thesis. Therefore, this chapter is going to discuss the 
definition of the banking system as we currently know it  (2.1), fundamentals  of the banking 
regulation in the EU (2.1.1) that will be followed by an overview of the Global financial crisis 
(2.1.2)  and the resulting  regulation  which  emerged afterwards  (2.1.3).  The regulation  of  the 
banking  system will  be  compared  to  the  developing  market  of  the  Fintech  industry,  which 
represents the abbreviation of the phrase financial technologies6 (2.2).
Before delving into the detailed analysis, it is worth noting that the purpose of this thesis 
is to assess the impacts of the PSD2 on banking and Fintech industry. Consequently, this chapter 
will provide an overview of banking and Fintech industry with the respective regulation of these 
two sectors in order to ascertain whether the level of regulation is comparable, and thus whether 
a  level  playing  field  is  guaranteed.  Accordingly,  not  all  of  the  innovative  start-ups  and 
companies  in  the emerging technological  innovation  sector,  such as  Proptech,  Insurtech and 
Mortgagetech, will be analysed in greater detail. The main aim will be to provide an overview of 
the current situation in which these industries approach (potential) changes coming along with 
the PSD2.
2.1. Banking system and the recent problems
The simplest  definition  of  banking is  that  banking comprises  of  certain  services  and 
business offered and provided by the banks.7 However, more precise definition can be achieved 
through delimitation of the respective activities banks perform in the economy.8 These activities 
include taking and holding deposits and/or other repayable funds from wide public (primarily 
households and firms)9 and investments of the (received) funds in their own name, especially by 
providing various types of loans.10
6 See e.g. DORFLEITNER, Gregor, HORNUF, Lars, SCHMITT, Matthias and WEBER, Martina.  Fintech in 
Germany.  New York,  NY: Springer Berlin  Heidelberg,  2017, pp.  5-10.  The detailed analysis of  the term 
Fintech will be given in part 2.2 of this thesis.
7  ‘Definition  of  banking’,  Oxford  Dictionaries,  Oxford  University,  available  at: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/banking, last accessed 20 August 2018.
8  BERGER, Allen N, MOLYNEUX, Philip and WILSON, John O. S.  The Oxford handbook of banking. 2nd 
edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 27-28.
9  Ibid.
10  Banks perform many other activities in the economy, but the above-mentioned activities form the core of the 
activities performed by traditional banking. The provided definition is based on the legal definition of “credit  
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As will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, the banks and their activities are 
heavily  regulated  both  at  a  national  level  and an  international  level,  whereas  the  respective 
regulation of banks has been strengthened after the Global financial crisis with a view to prevent 
similar crisis.11 The fundamental requirement to conduct banking activities in the Member States 
is to obtain appropriate authorisation before commencement of such activities.12 This is reflected 
in the Czech Act on Banks which provides that a bank shall mean a joint-stock company having 
its registered office in the Czech Republic which (i) accepts deposits from the public, and (ii) 
provides loans, and which has been granted a banking licence.13
Even though  the  importance  of  the  banks  varies  between  the  different  countries  and 
regions of the world, it is argued that due to their economic and financial importance they play a 
crucial role in the financial systems.14 As Allen and Carletti claim, banks have important role in 
connection  with  depositors’  funds,  “contribute  to  the  growth of  economy”  and “perform an 
important role in corporate governance”.15 Therefore, it is necessary to further analyse banking 
regulation at the EU level and the changes to the banking regulation that were brought about by 
the Global financial crisis. 
2.1.1.  Fundamentals of banking regulation in the European Union 
Integral  part  of  the  European  Union,  which  “has  been  a  central  part  of  European  
integration since the very beginning”16, is the internal market formed by the “four freedoms”: 
free movement of goods, capital, workers and establishment and the provision of services.17 In 
general,  the  banking  system is  connected  with  free  movements  of  capital  and  provision  of 
services.18 Consequently, these two freedoms will be further examined.
institutions” defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of the CRR as “an undertaking the business of which is to take  
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account”. Consequently, the 
term “banks” will be used as a synonym of “credit institutions” in this thesis.
11  See e.g.  CRAIG, Paul,  BÚRCA, de Gráinne.  EU law: text,  cases,  and materials. 6th ed.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2015, pp. 721-743.
12  Article 8(1) of the CRD IV. 
13  Article 1(1) of the Act No. 21/1992 Coll., on Banks, as amended. 
14  See RADU, Riana Iren, STRATULAT, Angelica. ‘New Aspects Regarding the Role of Banks in Economy in 
the Context of Globalization’ (2017) Annals of “Dunarea de Jos” University of Galati Fascicle I. Economics 
and Applied Informatics, year 2017, issue 1, pp. 161-166 and BERGER and MOLYNEUX, op. cit. No. 8, pp. 
27-46.
15  ALLEN, Franklin and CARLETTI, Elena as in BERGER and MOLYNEUX, op. cit. No. 8, p. 27.
16  TUOMINEN,  Tomi.  ‘The  European  Banking  Union:  A  Shift  in  the  Internal  Market  Paradigm?’  (2017) 
Common Market Law Review, volume 54, issue 5, p. 1361.
17  See  e.g.  CRAIG  and  BÚRCA,  op.  cit.  No.  11,  p.  608,  and  TOMÁŠEK,  Michal,  TÝČ,  Vladimír,  
MALENOVSKÝ, Jiří, et al. Právo Evropské unie. 2nd ed. Prague: Leges, 2017. Student (Leges), pp. 208-213.
18  The author of this thesis is  aware of the fact  that  the banking system is also closely connected with the  
freedom of establishment and relating provisions concerning the process of “passporting”. However, the space 
of this thesis precludes detailed analysis of these topics. As a result, passporting will be mentioned only briefly  
in the respective parts of this thesis in order to present some of the advantages this process brings about.
5
The core  provision of  free  movement  of  capital  included in Article  63 of  the TFEU 
prohibits  in its  first paragraph all  restrictions on the movement of capital  “between Member  
States and between Member States and third countries”,  while  the second paragraph thereof 
prohibits in the same manner restrictions on payments. Articles 64 to 66 of the TFEU lay down 
certain exceptions from the above-mentioned prohibitions, especially in connection with taxation 
and the prudential supervision of financial institutions.19 In  Sanz de Lera, the CJEU held that 
what is nowadays Article 63 of the TFEU shall have direct effect.20 As a result, relevant Articles 
of the TFEU have vertical and horizontal effect, which enables them to be used both against the 
individuals and the state.21 As an example,  that would be covered by the said effects can be 
mentioned a situation in which a bank prohibits payments between the Member States.22 
The second crucial freedom, which is closely connected to the topic of this whole thesis, 
covers freedom to provide services pursuant to Articles 56 to 62 of the TFEU. Pursuant to the 
aforementioned clauses, restrictions “on freedom to provide services within the Union in respect  
of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the  
person for whom the services are intended”23 shall be prohibited.24
In connection with regulation of banking in the EU, it is essential to elaborate on the 
institutions  that  influence  EU  regulation  and  banking  system.  Therefore,  the  following 
paragraphs will be dedicated to two of the significant institutions in this area, i.e. the European 
Central Bank and the European Banking Authority.
Firstly, the ECB together with the national central banks of the Member States whose 
currency is the euro are responsible of the monetary policy of the EU.25 Further, the task of 
maintaining price stability was conferred on the European System of Central Banks, which is 
governed by the national banks of all Member States and the ECB.26 The ECB is an independent 
body27 with its own legal personality28 that is entitled to make regulations, take decisions, make 
19  See Article 65(1) of the TFEU. For details regarding the exceptions see e.g. CRAIG and BÚRCA, op. cit. 
No. 11, pp. 724-726.
20  Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94,  Criminal Proceedings Against Lucas Emilio Sanz de Lera  
and Others [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:451.
21  CRAIG and BÚRCA, op. cit. No. 11, p. 722.
22  USHER, John A. The law of money and financial services in the EC . 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994. Oxford EC law library, pp. 14-16.
23  Article 56 of the TFEU.
24  For an extensive analysis regarding the right of establishment and freedom to provide services see e.g. CRAIG 
and BÚRCA, op. cit. No. 11, pp. 794-851, and TICHÝ, Luboš, RAINER, Arnold, ZEMÁNEK, Jiří, KRÁL, 
Richard and DUMBROVSKÝ, Tomáš. Evropské právo. 5th ed. Prague: C.H. Beck, 2014. Academia iuris (C. 
H. Beck), pp. 380-391.
25  Article 282(1) of the TFEU.
26  Article 129(1) of the TFEU read in conjunction with Articles 282(1) and 283(1) thereof.
27  Article 130 of the TFEU.
28  Article 282(3) of the TFEU.
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recommendations and deliver opinions in order to carry out the tasks that were conferred on it.29 
It has an Executive Board composed of the president, vice president and four other members30 
and  a  Governing  Council  that  comprises  of  the  members  of  the  Executive  Board  and  the 
Governors of the national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro.31 The 
importance of the ECB in relation to regulation is enshrined in Article 282(5) of the TFEU which 
provides that the ECB shall be consulted and may give its opinion to all proposed EU acts, and 
all proposals for regulation at national level. Following the Global financial crisis, the tasks of 
the  ECB were  extended  to  certain  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  banks, 
including specific supervisory tasks over the market32 and to specific advisory roles in procedure 
for the resolution of banks.33
Secondly, the European Banking Authority has been established on 1 January 201134 as 
one of the parts of the European System of Financial Supervision35 following the De Larosière 
report36 and  recommendations  included  therein.  At  the  EU  level,  the  ESFS  was  created 
comprising  of  the  European Systemic  Risk Board37 with  three micro-supervisory authorities, 
namely  the  EBA,  the  European  Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions  Authority38 and  the 
European Securities and Markets Authority39. The EBA is an independent authority40 with legal 
29  Articles 132(1) and 282(4) of the TFEU.
30  Article 283(2) of the TFEU. The current president of the ECB is Mario Draghi. Retrieved from the official  
websites  of  the  European  Central  Bank,  available  at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/eb/html/index.en.html, last accessed 25 August 2018.
31  Article 283(1) of the TFEU.
32  Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L 287/63 (29 
October 2013).
33  See the SRMR Regulation.
34  Articles 1(1) and 82 of the Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of  
24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending 
Decision  No.  716/2009/EC  and  repealing  Commission  Decision  2009/78/EC  [2010]  OJ  L  331/12  (15 
December 2010).
35  Article 1(2) of the Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential  oversight of the financial  system and establishing a 
European Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ L 331/1 (15 December 2010).
36  See  DE LAROSIÈRE,  Jacques  et  al.,  ‘The  High-Level  Group  on  Financial  Supervision  in  the  EU’ (25 
February  2009),  Brussels,  available  at:  http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf?
351e1b35ec1ca5e855d2e465383a311f, last accessed 25 August 2018.
37  Article 1(1) of the Regulation, op. cit. No. 35.
38  Article 1(1) of the Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November  2010  establishing  a  European  Supervisory  Authority  (European  Insurance  and  Occupational 
Pensions Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC 
[2010] OJ L 331/48 (15 December 2010).
39  Article 1(1) of the Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), 
amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L 331/84 
(15 December 2010).
40  Article 1(5) of the Regulation, op. cit. No. 34.
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personality41, whose main task is to safeguard financial  stability,  the integrity,  efficiency and 
orderly functioning of the banking sector and to improve functioning of the internal  market, 
especially by ensuring effective and consistent level of regulation and supervision.42 In order to 
realise the tasks conferred on it, the EBA is authorised to draft regulatory technical standards, 
issue  guidelines  and  recommendations,  take  individual  decisions  and  issue  opinions.43 
Furthermore,  the EBA with its  expertise  shall  contribute  to the  preparation of  the European 
Single Rulebook in the banking including a harmonised prudential rules for banks in the EU.44 
The above-mentioned authorities of the EBA are particularly important in relation to the PSD2 
given that many of the features of the revised payment system are based on technical standards, 
guidelines and opinions of the EBA, as will be further demonstrated.
The provided analysis of the fundamental regulation of the EU banking system represents 
only  the  general  frameworks  which  is  further  supplemented  by  the  extensive  secondary 
legislation focusing on the topic of banking regulation.45 Therefore, the following paragraphs 
will briefly mention the roots of the Global financial crisis together with the resulting changes to 
banking regulation in the EU.
2.1.2. The Global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the impacts on banking
Due to the fact that most of the aspects of the Global financial crisis were analysed in 
detail  by many other authors46, this thesis will provide a basis overview of the causes of the 
Global financial crises, which led to the changes in regulation of banking system and arguably 
contributed to the growth of the Fintech companies.47 
The core of the Global financial crisis can be seen in the subprime mortgage market48, but 
the  crisis  has  spread  throughout  many  markets  which  were  closely  connected,  in  particular 
housing market, securities market and financial market, which resulted in the Global financial 
41  Article 5(1) of the Regulation, op. cit. No. 34.
42  Article 1(5) of the Regulation, op. cit. No. 34.
43  Articles 10, 15, 16, 17(3), 17(6), 18(3), 18(4), 19(3) and 19(4) of the Regulation, op. cit. No. 34.
44  Recital  22  of  the  Regulation,  op.  cit.  No.  34.  See  also  the  official  websites  of  the  EBA,  available  at:  
https://www.eba.europa.eu/about-us, last accessed 23 August 2018.
45  CRAIG and BÚRCA, op. cit. No. 11, p. 795.
46  See e.g. GORTON, Gary. The maze of banking: history, theory, crisis. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2015,  pp.  583-668,  CASSIS,  Youssef,  GROSSMAN, Richard  S and  SCHENK, Catherine  R.  The Oxford  
handbook  of  banking  and  financial  history.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  (2016),  pp.  439-460,  and 
MAYNTZ, Renate (ed). Crisis and Control: Institutional Change in Financial Market Regulation. Frankfurt: 
Campus, 2012.
47  See ARNER, Douglas W., BARBERIS, Jànos, BUCKLEY, Ross P. ‘The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-
Crisis Paradigm’ (2016) Georgetown Journal of International Law, No. 2016-62, p. 8.
48  See  SHARMA,  Shalendra  D.  Global  financial  contagion:  building  a  resilient  world  economy  after  the  
subprime crisis. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 102-189
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crisis with the banking system in its centre. The Global financial crisis started in the summer of 
2007 with its peak in September and October 2008 in the USA, whereas the crisis quickly spread 
throughout the rest of the world.49 In history, it was characteristic that the financial crisis was 
accompanied by run on the banks when many people tried to withdraw their money because of 
the fear that the bank may cease to exist or function. Similarly, the Global financial crisis was 
accompanied by a run on the banks, but this time not the individuals but the companies were 
running on investment banks.50 
To put it simply, the housing market contained many risky subprime mortgages, which 
were provided to the households under favourable conditions. These mortgages were bundled 
with  other  assets,  such as  loans  and commercial  debts  in  the  process  called  securitization.51 
Through the process of securitization credit derivates were created and traded in the derivatives 
market. It is worth noting that in this process many participants were engaged but the crucial 
contribution  can  be  seen  in  the  shadow banking  system.52 This  system,  which  had  avoided 
regulation for a long period of time and thus was able to expand without proper monitoring, 
included  non-depository  banks,  such  as  investment  banks,  hedge  funds  and  special  purpose 
vehicles.53 The special  purpose vehicles were often founded and sponsored by the traditional 
banks thereby providing the traditional banks with an access to leveraged investments.54 Before 
the Global financial crisis erupted, the shadow banking system outgrew the traditional banking 
system in the USA.55 The whole system lacked transparency,  clear  rules,  accountability  and 
appropriate oversight.56
The Global financial crisis was primarily triggered by the collapse of the housing market 
caused by the rapidly  growing number of mortgage defaults,  which  was exaggerated  by the 
mortgage-backed securities that started to lose their value.57 These events caused panic within the 
49  GORTON, Gary.  Misunderstanding financial  crises:  why we don't  see them coming.  New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2012, pp. 182-199.
50  Ibid, pp. 4-28.
51  SCARDOVI,  Claudio.  Digital  transformation  in  financial  services.  New  York,  NY:  Springer  Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2017, pp. 6-24.
52  RIXEN, Thomas. ‘Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble: Shadow banking, offshore financial centers, and 
jurisdictional competition’ (2013) Regulation & Governance, vol. 7, issue 4, pp. 435-459.
53  Ibid.
54  PLANTIN,  Guillaume ‘Shadow Banking and  Bank Capital  Regulation’ (2015)  The Review of Financial  
Studies, vol. 28, Issue 1, pp. 158-166.
55  See POZSAR, Zoltan, et al. ‘Shadow Banking’ (2010), Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 
458.  Revised  February  2012,  pp.  2-6,  available  at: 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf,  last  accessed  23  August 
2018. 
56  BARR, Michael S. ‘The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform’ (2012) Yale J. on Regulation 29, No. 1, p.  
92.
57  BRUNNERMEIER, Markus K. ‘Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008’ (2009) Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 92-94.
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financial markets and resulted primarily in increased demand for additional financial collateral 
by the market participants, given that the value of the provided collateral (i.e. mortgages) was 
dropping down. Nevertheless, the market participants were not willing to provide such collateral 
or  did  not  have  the  necessary  resources,  and  thus  a  liquidity  crunch  followed.58 As  a 
consequence, the governments, central banks and other participants were forced to step in and 
bail out failing banks and other institutions and support the market by financial injections.59 The 
interconnectedness of the global financial markets contributed to the spread of the financial crisis 
throughout the world.
As regards the consequences  of the Global  financial  crisis,  it  is  considered to be the 
biggest  financial  crisis  since  the  Great  Depression  of  1929.60 Lehman Brothers  collapsed  in 
September 200861, while many other institutions had to be rescued, including investments banks 
such as Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns and mortgage loan companies Fannie May and Freddie 
Mac in the USA.62 At the beginning of the spread of the financial crisis in the EU, the main 
victims that had to be rescued were commercial banks in the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Ireland  due to  their  investment  involvement  in  various  American  securities.63 However,  this 
brought about a dramatic squeeze on the real economy in relation to the necessary write offs of 
certain assets by the banks.64 Therefore, the whole economic activity in the EU weakened and 
unemployment rose in countries directly  hit  by the financial  crisis  while these consequences 
quickly spread to another countries.65 Moreover, the financial crisis in the EU was not limited 
only to banks that needed to be rescued but it had deep impacts on the EU governments which 
had serious problems with financing of their sovereign debt.66 As a result, the European Financial 
Stability Facility was established and entrusted with the authority to lend up to EUR 440 billion 
to  the  Member  States  that  were  experiencing  financial  difficulties.67 This  system  was 
58  Ibid, pp. 85-87. 
59  BARR, op. cit. No. 56, p. 92.
60  BENCZUR, Peter, et al. ‘Evaluating the effectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell 
to bail-out?’ (2017) Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 33, pp. 207-223.
61  CHALMERS, Damian, DAVIES, Gareth and MONTI, Giorgio. European Union law: text and materials. 3rd 
edition. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chalmers, p. 47
62  AVGOULEAS, Emilios. ‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Disclosure Paradigm in European Financial 
Regulation: The Case for Reform’ (2009) European Company and Financial Law Review, vol. 6, No. 4, p. 25.
63  See ‘Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of Democracy’ (2011), SCHARPF, Fritz W., MPIfG 
Discussion Paper 11/11, available at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp11-11.pdf, last accessed 25 August 
2018. The conformity with the relevant provisions of the TFEU regarding prohibited state aids was questioned  
but it  was ultimately found to be within the boundaries of the EU law. For details see e.g. CHALMERS, 
DAVIES and MONTI, op. cit. No. 61, pp. 1082-1086 
64  Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of Democracy, op. cit. No. 63, p. 25
65  Ibid, pp. 25-26.
66  CHALMERS, DAVIES and MONTI, op. cit. No. 61, p. 48.
67  Ibid, p. 48.
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subsequently replaced by the European Stability Mechanism.68 From 2010 to 2013, some sort of 
financial assistance was provided to Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain and Cyprus.69
Legislators in the USA reacted to the Global financial crisis by adoption of the Dodd-
Frank  Wall  Street  Reform  and  Consumer  Protection  Act  of  2010,  which  comprehensively 
modified  the  regulation  of  the  financial  institutions  in  the  USA  and,  inter  alia,  prohibited 
proprietary trading carried out by the banks.70 The changes concerning the banking system were 
also needed in the EU.
2.1.3. The  aftermath  of  the  Global  financial  crisis  and  the  subsequent 
regulation
In the aftermath of the Global financial crisis, it became apparent that the regulation of 
the banking sector was insufficient and could not be left to the banks to regulate themselves.71 
The provided financial assistance to the individual Member States was not sufficient to solve all 
the problems brought by the Global financial crisis, and thus it was necessary to supplement it 
with regulation of the financial system.72 
First of the major regulatory changes had in its sight remedy of economic governance 
weakness by giving increased oversight over national economic policies.73 These measures were 
implemented in 2011 and include so-called “six-pack” measures74 composed of five regulations75 
68  CRAIG and BÚRCA, op. cit. No. 11, p. 738.
69  CHALMERS, DAVIES and MONTI, op. cit. No. 61, p. 714.
70  INDER,  Jens-Hinrich.  ‘Ring-Fencing:  An  Integrated  Approach  with  Many  Unknowns’  (2015)  European 
Business Organization Law Review, vol. 16, issue 1, pp. 98-114.
71  BARR, op. cit. No. 56, p. 92.
72  CRAIG and BÚRCA, op. cit. 11, p. 739.
73  See SMITS, René. ‘The Crisis Response in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: Overview of Legal  
Developments’  (2015)  Fordham  International  Law  Journal,  vol.  38,  issue  4,  pp.  1144  and  CRAIG  and 
BÚRCA, op. cit. No. 11, p. 739
74  Ibid. The regulations and directives were adopted pursuant to Articles 121(6), 126(14) and 136 of the TFEU.
75  Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
effective  enforcement  of  budgetary  surveillance  in  the  euro  area  [2011]  L  306/1  (23  November  2011), 
Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L 306/8 (23 
November  2011),  Regulation (EU)  No.  1175/2011 of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 
November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary  positions  and  the  surveillance  and  coordination  of  economic  policies  [2011]  OJ  L 306/12  (23 
November  2011),  Regulation (EU)  No.  1176/2011 of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 
November  2011  on  the  prevention  and  correction  of  macroeconomic  imbalances  [2011]  OJ  L 306/8  (23 
November 2011) and Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) 
No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [2011] OJ L 
306/33 (23 November 2011).
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and  one  directive76,  which  were  subsequently  supplemented  by  the  “two-pack”  measures  in 
201377.  The  common  objective  of  these  measures  can  be  seen  in  strengthening  budgetary 
oversight,  enhancing compliance  system with reporting duties  together  with the necessity  of 
independent verification.78 
Due to the fact that insufficient regulation of the banking system was one of the major 
causes of the Global financial system, it was necessary to revise the whole framework relating to 
regulation of banks. Changes to the banking system and regulation thereof were profound and 
the major changes can be divided into three parts: (i) measures relating to capital requirements, 
(ii) modified rules for bank resolution and recovery and (iii) regulation of financial instruments.79 
Even though the measures closely relate to banking system, they also address financial market in 
general, shadow banking and insurance sector.80
The foundation of the first set of measures can be seen in Basel III rules that were revised 
in 2017.81 These rules represent the outcome of global discussion regarding necessary changes to 
the banking system with regard to global capital standards prepared by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervisors with the aim of preventing similar crisis in the future.82 As a result, the first 
regulation in the field of banking regulation83 together with the CRD IV directive were adopted. 
The rationale behind the adoption of one of the measures in the form of regulation was to ensure 
direct  applicability  with  uniform  application  throughout  the  Member  States  without  the 
possibility of the particular Member States for gold plating and similar distortion by the Member 
States.84 In general, these two measures stipulate certain prudential requirements with a view to 
76  Council  Directive  2011/85/EU  of  8  November  2011  on  requirements  for  budgetary  frameworks  of  the 
Member States [2011] OJ L 306/41 (23 November 2011)
77  Regulation (EU) No.  472/2013 of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the Council  of  21 May 2013 on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary  surveillance  of  Member States  in the euro area  experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability [2013] OJ L 140/1 (27 May 2013) 
and Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common 
provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit  
of the Member States in the euro area [2013] OJ L 140/11 (27 May 2013).
78  CRAIG and BÚRCA, op. cit. No. 11, p. 740. For detailed analysis please see SMITS, op. cit. No. 73.
79  The detailed overview of the measures that have been adopted in connection with the Global financial crisis  
can  be  seen  in  the  Economic  Review  of  the  Financial  Regulation  Agenda,  available  at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/general/20140515-erfra-working-document_en.pdf,  last 
accessed 25 August 2018.
80  BENCZUR, et al., op. cit. No. 60, p. 208.
81  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements ‘Basel III: Finalising post-crisis 
reforms’  (December  2017),  available  at:  https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf,  last  accessed  20  August 
2018.
82  BARR, op. cit. No. 56, pp. 114-117.
83  Represented  by the CRR. See also KUDRNA, Zdenek and RIEKMANN, Sonja Puntscher ‘Harmonizing 
national options and discretions in the EU banking regulation’ (2018) Journal of Economic Policy Reform, vol.  
21, No. 2, p. 147.
84  Recital  12 of  the CRR. As regards  “gold plating”,  for  details  see  e.g.  KRÁL, Richard,  SCHEU, Harald 
Christian, KULDA, Miloš, MÁDR, Petr, MATYSOVÁ, Monika, NAVRÁTIL, Petr and VONDRÁČKOVÁ, 
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ensure solvency of financial  institutions,  while the measures contain various other provisions 
such as provisions regarding remuneration policies.85As regards the prudential requirements, the 
CRD IV and the CRR set out quality and quantity of the capital that banks and other relevant 
institutions must retain in order to handle unexpected turns. It is important to note that the CRR 
and the CRD IV are currently under revision and new Capital  Requirements  Regulation and 
Capital Requirements Directive are being prepared by the European Commission.86
Closely related to the first set of measures are the modified rules for bank resolution and 
recovery that were adopted in 2014. The updated rules are composed of the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution  Directive  together  with  the  Single  Resolution  Mechanism  Regulation.  BRRD 
stipulates  certain rules and mechanisms for banks and other institutions  which are failing or 
likely to fail in order to prevent systemic damages to the internal market.87 SRMR Regulation 
established the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for the Member States participating in the 
euro zone that basically applies the mechanism created under the BRRD to the Banking Union, 
which will be described below.88 The crucial decision-making role in SRM is conferred on the 
Single Resolution Board89 the and the possible resolution shall be financed through the Single 
Resolution Fund.90
One of the steps taken by the EU after the Global financial crisis was the establishment of 
the Banking Union with the purpose of securing the proper function of the euro area.91 The 
Banking Union shall be based upon the Single Rulebook and it shall consist of three main pillars: 
surveillance, resolution and deposit guarantee.92 As regards the Single Rulebook, the main aim 
should be to “ensure the consistent application of the regulatory banking framework across the  
EU”93.  The  Single  Rulebook  is  also  composed  of  three  parts:  measures  relating  to  capital 
requirements, i.e. the CRR and the CRD IV, rules for bank resolution and recovery included in 
Aneta.  Zbytečně zatěžující transpozice - neodůvodněný gold-plating směrnic EU v České republice.  Praha: 
Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Právnická fakulta, 2014, pp. 5-14.
85 See e.g. Recitals 7, 34 and 62 of the CRR.
86  The planned actions regarding the CRD IV and the CRR and amendments thereof are available at the official  
websites  of  the  European  Commission.  Details  regarding  the  CRD  V,  available  at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/node/6089, last accessed 23 August 2018 and details regarding the CRR II, available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/node/6104, last accessed 23 August 2018.
87  See Recitals 1-3 of the BRRD.
88  Article 5 of the SRMR Regulation.
89  Articles 42–55 of the SRMR Regulation.
90  TUOMINEN, op. cit. No. 16, p. 1369.
91  Ibid, p. 1368.
92  SMITS, op. cit. No. 73, pp. 1172-1179.
93  See  the  official  websites  of  the  EBA,  ‘Interactive  Single  Rulebook’,  available  at:  
http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-rulebook/interactive-single-rulebook/-/interactive-
single-rulebook/main_documents;jsessionid=5B52C6B6B7DB0EFBFBB8D484A26B9543,  last  accessed  25 
August 2018.
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the BRRD and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive94 focusing on harmonization of national 
deposit  guarantee schemes.95 The first  pillar  of the Banking Union is the  Single Supervisory  
Mechanism consisting of the ECB and the national supervisory authorities, whereas the ECB has 
the leading role as the body entrusted with supervisory powers over the significant European 
banks.96 The  above-mentioned  SRM  for  banks  forms  the  second  pillar.  Nevertheless,  the 
proposed  Banking  Union  has  not  been  properly  formed  due  to  the  fact  that  the  intended 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme proposed by the European Commission has not yet been 
adopted.97
Finally,  certain  measures  that  should  strengthen  the  transparency  and  enhance  the 
stability and functioning of the internal market have been adopted in the wake of the Global 
financial  crisis,  whereas  these  measures  form the  last  part  of  this  chapter  dedicated  to  the 
regulation of financial instruments. As was mentioned in part  2.1.2 of this thesis, market with 
derivatives contributed to the development and spread of the Global financial crisis. One of these 
derivatives were the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, which are not traded on the regulated 
markets, and thus OTC derivatives lack the transparency.98 As a result, the EMIR Regulation was 
adopted  to  tackle  these  problems with  OTC derivatives.  It  was  also necessary  to  revise  the 
regulations  relating  to  investment  services  and  financial  markets  with  derivatives  traded  on 
regulated markets. However, preparation and negotiation of these documents took many years, 
and  therefore  the  relevant  measures  came into  force  only  recently.  These  measures  include 
MiFID II Directive accompanied by MiFIR Regulation, whereas the last transposition deadline 
for MiFID II Directive lapsed only recently, i.e. on 3 January 2018.99
The provided analysis supports the claim stated at the beginning of the chapter that the 
banks are heavily regulated, while it was pointed out that the regulation of the banking system 
has been tightened and strengthened in aftermath of the Global financial crisis. Many different 
measures have been adopted both at a national level and the EU level, for example in the United 
Kingdom more than 80 regulations and rules to the domestic market have been enacted in the 
94  Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee 
schemes (recast) [2014] OJ L 173/149 (12 June 2014).
95 Ibid, Article 1. See also TUOMINEN, op. cit. No. 16, p. 1368.
96  See the Council Regulation, op. cit. No. 32. For details regarding the SSM please see the official websites of  
the  European  Central  Bank,  available  at: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html, last accessed 25 August 2018.
97  See Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  amending Regulation (EU) 
806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme.
98  Article 2(7) of the EMIR Regulation read in conjunction with Recital 4 thereof.
99  See Article 93 of the MiFID II Directive and the MiFIR Regulation.
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aftermath of the Global financial crisis.100 It is also evident that there is the tendency to of the 
European  Commission  to  adopt  measures  in  the  form  of  regulations  in  order  to  prevent 
insufficient  and inconsistent  transposition  of  these  measures  within  the  Member  States.  The 
Global financial crisis had impacts on banks and some of these institutions either collapsed or 
had to be rescued by governments. The system of the banks was shaken up to its core and the 
public trust in institutions such as banks has been severely damaged.101 It can be hard for the 
wide public to grasp that none of the senior Wall Street executives who were in charge of the 
banks and other institutions, and thus can be seen as the main culprits of the Global financial  
crisis, were held accountable.102 Moreover, it took many years before the banks paid any fines in 
relation  to  the  Global  financial  crisis103,  whereas  in  the  public  eyes  the  costs  of  the  Global 
financial  crisis  were  passed  on  the  taxpayers  through  governmental  bail  outs.  Besides  the 
diminished  trust  of  the  public  in  banks  and  tightened  oversight  by  the  regulators,  these 
institutions have to face new challenges coming along with increased competition by companies 
that put in practice novel technologies. 
Therefore,  the following part  of this  thesis  will  provide a definition  of  these Fintech 
companies in the context of the financial  system and it will draw a comparison between the 
regulation of the banking system and Fintech sector. The overview of these two sectors is crucial 
for a proper assessment of the changes coming along with the PSD2.
2.2. Fintech Industry and how has it evolved
First of all, the basic definition of the Fintech will be provided together with the main 
fields in which the Fintech companies operate. Similarly as the chapter regarding the banking, 
the analysis will focus on the effects caused by the Global financial crisis (2.2.1) and the post-
crisis development which continues up to the current date (2.2.2). Finally, a basic overview of 
the regulatory framework of the Fintech industry will be given together with the comparison 
between the regulation of the banking and the Fintech industry (2.2.3).
100  See TEIGLAND, Robin, SIRI,  Shahryar,  LARSSON, Anthony, MORENO, Alejandro Puertas,  BOGUSZ, 
Claire Ingram.  The Rise and Development  of  FinTech:  Accounts  of  Disruption from Sweden and Beyond. 
London, Routledge, 2018, p. 4.
101  See CHIU, Iris H-Y. ‘A new era in fintech payment innovations? A perspective from the institutions and 
regulation of payment systems’ (2017) Law, Innovation and Technology, vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 194.
102  See e.g. ‘Who was convicted because of the global financial crisis?’, The Financial Times, 2017, available at:  
https://www.ft.com/content/de173cc6-7c79-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c, last accessed 25 August 2018.
103  See  e.g.  ‘How  banks  paid  for  crisis-era  misdeeds‘,  The  Financial  Times,  2017,  available  at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/150d2a7a-7869-11e7-a3e8-60495fe6ca71, last accessed 25 August 2018.
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Modern  technologies  have  become part  of  our  everyday lives  and these technologies 
make  many  processes  easier  and  faster  than  ever.  The  modern  technologies  have  been 
developing on an unprecedent scale and it is definitely hard to keep up with the pace of the 
developments. Even more challenging is the task for regulators who have to ensure that attention 
is given to different stakes of the parties and a proper regulation is put in place. Even though the 
modern  technologies  bring  us  many  benefits,  it  is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  that  these 
technologies  also  bring  about  many  potential  threats,  such  as  diminished  protection  of 
consumers, cyber security issues and high volatility of new crypto-currencies.
The field of financial  services has not been spared of the proliferation of the modern 
technologies throughout various segments. The dictionary definition submits that Fintech means 
“computer programs and other technology used to  support  or enable banking and financial  
services”104. The more precise definition was provided by the Financial Stability Board which 
sees the Fintech as “technologically enabled innovation in financial services that could result in  
new business models, applications, processes or products with an associated material effect on  
financial markets and institutions and the provision of financial services”105.
The Fintech companies are not only start-up companies but some of them are already 
well-established companies within the global markets. Accordingly, it is possible to receive and 
send payments on the Internet with only a few clicks by the provider of services PayPal.106 When 
a person decides that he needs funds to finance the development of his house he does not need to 
go to a bank, but he can decide to raise a capital  through a crowd funding and peer-to-peer 
lending.  Another  example  can  be  seen  in  innovative  companies  offering  financial  services 
consisting of management of various bank accounts in one place and providing an overview of 
personal finances with a complementary advice regarding possible savings.107
The provided examples represent only a few of the Fintech companies that are trying to 
penetrate the market with financial services by providing services that are in a certain way novel 
to the market and distinctive from the services currently offered by well-established institutions, 
such as banks. Given the prevailing services that these Fintech companies offer, they can be 
104  ‘Definition  of  Fintech’,  Oxford  Dictionaries,  Oxford  University,  available  at: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fintech, last accessed 23 August 2018.
105  Monitoring  of  FinTech,  Financial  Stability  Board,  available  at:  http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-
development/additional-policy-areas/monitoring-of-FinTech/, last accessed 23 August 2018.
106  The official websites of the company PayPal, available at:  https://www.paypal.com/uk/webapps/mpp/about, 
last accessed 23 August 2018.
107  These services are also offered by one of the Czech companies, i.e. by the company Spendee. See the official  
websites of the company Spendee, available at: https://www.spendee.com/about, last accessed 23 August 2018. 
The last example will probably fall under the definition of the account information service provider within the  
meaning of Article 4(19) of the PSD2. 
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distributed into five major  areas:  (i)  finance and investment,  (ii)  internal  operations  and risk 
management,  (iii)  payments  and  infrastructure,  (iv)  data  security  and  monetization,  and  (v) 
customer interface.108 Given that the Fintech companies did not appear out of blue, but some of 
them have gradually developed over the time, it is necessary to provide a brief historic overview. 
2.2.1. The evolution of Fintech and the consequences of the Global financial 
crisis
The origin of the word Fintech can be traced back to the early 1990s when this world was 
used by Citigroup (then under its business name Citicorp) in their Financial Services Technology 
Consortium, whose aim was to promote technological innovation and cooperation with outside 
companies.109
The development in the sector of financial technologies is not entirely new, but it has 
changed which companies offer such novel services. It is worth focusing on the era beginning in 
1950s and 1960s when the financial industry began its transition from an analogue to a digital 
industry.110 One of the companies that could be considered as a first Fintech company is the 
company Bloomberg that came up with a software called Bloomberg Terminal developed for the 
professionals in the financial services sector that provides real-time market data.111
The  important  milestones  came  with  the  development  of  online  banking,  new  IT 
developments in internal system of banks and the spread of the usage of the World Wide Web 
and the Internet.112 These developments connected with digitalization brought about the changes 
in the functioning of the financial services by amended environment and the way banks provided 
their services. Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize that most of the changes were coming 
from the internal  needs  of  the banks to  provide better  services  to  customers  without  bigger 
threats from other innovative companies. The banks themselves tried to innovate their services 
given that they had the appropriate funds to develop and improve their services without bigger 
disruptive forces such as Fintech companies. 
Many authors argue that the turning point for the surge of the Fintech companies and 
expansion of the Fintech industry can be seen in the Global financial crisis and the events that 
108  See ARNER, BARBERIS and BUCKLEY, op. cit. No. 47, p. 1281-1283.
109  See WALKER, George.  ‘Financial  Technology Law - A New Beginning and a New Future’ (2017) The 
International Lawyer, vol. 50, issue 1, pp. 137-139 and ARNER, BARBERIS and BUCKLEY, op. cit. No. 47, 
p. 1272-1274.




followed.113 In the years that followed the Global financial crisis, the position of the banks in the 
market  of  financial  services  was  disrupted.  As  was  already  established,  the  banks  found 
themselves  in  a  situation  in  which  they  had to  fight  for  their  survival  while  some of  them 
perceived as “too big to fail” had to be rescued by the governments.114 The customers of the 
banks  changed  their  perception  of  the  banks  as  stable  institutions  and  the  position  of  the 
consumers was threatened by the Global financial crisis.115 The regulators turned their attention 
towards the banks as they tried to build a more resilient and stable environment for the financial 
services. Accordingly, the oversight of the banks was strengthened.
Even  though  it  may  be  argued  that  the  aforesaid  events  connected  with  the  Global 
financial crisis were not the most crucial ones in the development and the surge of the Fintech 
companies, they definitely contributed to the improvement of the position and competitiveness of 
the Fintech industry compared to the banking system and helped the Fintech industry to gain 
more trust from the wide public.116 However, the whole economic was affected by the Global 
financial crisis, and thus the development of the Fintech industry was affected. Consequently, the 
following part will focus on the development of the Fintech industry after the Global financial 
crisis and the main forces driving the Fintech industry will be identified.
2.2.2. Medialization of the Fintech Industry and the contemporary situation
Teigland,  Siri,  Larsson,  Moreno  and  Bogusz provide  four  forces  currently  driving 
changes in financial services in Sweden, which can be generalized and employed in this thesis in 
connection with the provided analysis.117 These forces include: regulations, cognition: legitimacy 
and changing believes, new norms enabled by new technologies and a view of the actors.118
The first force driving the change was already mentioned in connection with banking 
regulation.  It  has been already demonstrated that banks have to comply with many different 
regulations. The following part regarding the regulation of the Fintech industry will present that 
113  See  e.g.  ROMĀNOVA, Inna,  GRIMA, Simon,  SPITERI,  Jonathan,  KUDINSKA,  Marina.  ‘The Payment 
Services Directive II and Competitiveness: The Perspective of European Fintech Companies’ (2018) European 
Research  Studies  Journal,  vol.  XXI,  issue  2,  pp.  3-22,  HARASIM,  Janina,  KLIMONTOWICZ,  Monika. 
‘Regulations as a tool to increase consumer protection on the European retail payment market’ (2018) Journal 
of Economics & Management, vol. 31, pp. 50-73, MASCHEK, Wolfgang A. ‘EU Regulatory and Supervisory 
Trends for FinTech Operators in Europe - A Policy Perspective (Including a View on Brexit)’ (2016) FinTech 
Law Report, vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 1-10 and ARNER, BARBERIS and BUCKLEY, op. cit. No. 47, pp. 1272-
1318.
114  See MAGNUSON, William J. ‘Regulating Fintech’ (2018) Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 71, pp. 1168-1225.
115  See MASCHEK, op. cit. No. 113, pp. 1-3.
116  See ARNER, BARBERIS and BUCKLEY, op. cit. No. 47, pp. 1272-1279.
117  See TEIGLAND, SIRI, LARSSON, MORENO and BOGUSZ, op. cit. No. 100, p. 18.
118  Ibid.
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the regulation of the Fintech companies is not as stringent as banks and other relating financial 
institutions. Moreover, it will be argued that the Fintech companies are provided with specific 
possibilities to avoid the regulation for a limited period of time.
Under the second driving force, we can find the perception of the wide public of the 
relevant actors in the financial services system. In places such as United Kingdom, California, 
New York, Singapore,  Germany,  Australia  and Hong Kong,  which are considered to be the 
leading Fintech centres, the working environment for the Fintech companies is friendly and open 
towards innovative solutions.119 
The third driving force can be seen in the technologies and new standard, which are in 
high  demand  in  the  financial  markets,  that  are  produced  by  the  Fintech  companies.  These 
technologies  include  robo-advisors  capable  of  replacing  humans  in  making  certain  financial 
decision  currently  done  by the  banks,  big  data  analytics  that  may  provide  banks  and other 
institutions with relevant information regarding their customers and blockchain technology that 
may potentially change the way public registers works.120
Finally, the ways and means through which the investors invest money have changed and 
these changes have impacts on the Fintech industry. This is accompanied by the expansion of the 
usage  of  the  Internet  which  allows  wide  public  to  look  for  investments  and  it  enables  the 
institutional investors to easily monitor the current investment opportunities. 121
The four above-mentioned driving forces together with the events connected with the 
Global financial crisis have contributed to the constant growth of the Financial industry. The 
term “Fintech” became a buzzword approximately in 2014, when the relevant authorities, market 
participants,  consumers and academics started to closely monitor the Fintech industry.122 The 
amount of investments in the Fintech industry is growing with the amount of USD 41.7 billion 
already invested in the first half  of 2018 with the prediction of the additional  growth of the 
market  size.123 Nevertheless,  when we compare  this  figure  with  the  reported  revenue of  the 
119  See WALKER, op. cit. No. 109, pp. 144-147.
120  See TEIGLAND, SIRI, LARSSON, MORENO and BOGUSZ, op. cit.  No. 100, pp. 9-11. As regards the 
public registers, Sweden is currently testing blockchain land registers that may make transfers of real estate  
easier. See e.g. ‘A Pioneer in Real Estate Blockchain Emerges in Europe’ (6 March 2018), The Wall Street  
Journal,  available  at:  https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-pioneer-in-real-estate-blockchain-emerges-in-europe-
1520337601, last accessed 25 August 2018.
121  See WALKER, op. cit. No. 109, pp. 139-144.
122  See ARNER, BARBERIS and BUCKLEY, op. cit.  No. 47, pp. 1272-1273. This also correlates  with the 
frequency of the word “Fintech” being looked up in the Internet. See Google Trends regarding the “Fintech”, 
available at: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=Fintech, last accessed 25 August 2018.
123  See  e.g.  ‘2018 is  already  a  record  year  for  global  FinTech  investment’  (11  July  2018),  Fintech  Global, 
available at: http://fintech.global/2018-is-already-a-record-year-for-global-fintech-investment/, last accessed 25 
August 2018.
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biggest European bank HSBC for 2017, which amounted to USD 51.4 billion with the total 
assets  worth  USD  2,522  billion,124 it  becomes  apparent  that  the  size  of  the  banks  is  still 
considerably bigger.125
While it may be true that the Fintech industry offers advantages for the wide public, there 
are still concerns regarding the disadvantages and threats that these Fintech companies may bring 
along to the whole financial market.126 These potential disadvantages cover, inter alia, regulatory 
challenges,  threats  to financial  stability and financial  integrity,  exchange controls and capital 
flow  management  and  consumer  protection.127 Given  that  these  potential  disadvantages  are 
closely related to the regulation of the Fintech industry, the following part of this thesis will take 
a closer look at the current regulatory and supervisory issues connected with Fintech industry.
2.2.3.  Regulation of the Fintech Industry
This part will focus on regulation at the level of respective Member States and at the EU 
level. At the same time, a number of remarks regarding other countries will be made in order to 
create an overview of the regulation in the majority of the Fintech industry.
As a general rule, the Fintech companies are not exempted from the legal regime of the 
Member States or from the laws of the EU. Consequently, the Fintech companies conducting 
their  business  activities  in  the  EU will  be  assed  based on their  activities,  and subsequently 
relevant  supervision or authorisation  will  be applied  or  required.128 Accordingly,  the Fintech 
companies can be subject to EU regulatory regime, national regulation or no regulation at all 
provided that the relevant area is not regulated by national or EU rules.129 In other words, even 
the Fintech companies will be regulated by the respective EU and national rules, which apply to 
other companies in the same sector. The easiest way how to illustrate the possible situations is to 
present a few examples that will demonstrate how these Fintech companies can be regulated.
124  See ‘The Annual Results’, HSBC Holdings plc, available at: https://www.hsbc.com/investor-relations/group-
results-and-reporting/group-reporting-archive/annual-results-2017-quick-read, last accessed 25 August 2018.
125  Please note that the figures should serve only for simplified illustration of the current situation. The author of 
this thesis is aware of the fact that other indicators and figures are relevant for the proper comparison, but the 
purpose of this thesis is not to provide an economic overview of banking and Fintech industry. 
126  See WALKER, op cit. No. 109, pp. 137-215.
127  See International Monetary Fund, ‘Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations’ (January 2016), 
Discussion  Note,  pp.  24-38,  available  at:  https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf,  last 
accessed 25 August 2018.
128  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: FinTech Action plan: For a  
more competitive and innovative European financial sector COM(2018) 109 final, p. 5.
129  Ibid.
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As  a  first  illustration,  regulation  of  the  Fintech  company  Zonky,  which  provides  a 
platform  for  peer-to-peer  lending,  will  be  presented.130 Given  that  this  company  operates  a 
platform through which  people  raise  money  and the  amount  of  loans  provided through this 
platform does not exceed a certain threshold, the company is registered with the Czech National 
Bank as  a  small  payment  institution.131 This  regime provides  the  respective  companies  with 
certain exclusions, and therefore they are not as strictly regulated as banks.132
The second example can be the Fintech company Twisto that provides its customers with 
a possibility to pay for their expenses (especially their invoices), while the customers must repay 
the corresponding amounts at some specified time in the future, i.e. the company offers services 
consisting  in  some  form  of  "deferred  payments".133 Considering  the  nature  of  the  services 
provided by this company and the total sums that are being transferred, the company is regulated 
as a payment institution.134
The  last  example  will  represent  a  possibility  to  operate  as  a  bank.  Therefore,  if  the 
relevant Fintech company wishes to conduct banking activities in the Czech Republic as a bank, 
then they have to obtain a banking licence from the Czech National Bank pursuant to Act on 
Banks. Nevertheless, banking activities represent specific activities within the financial market 
and not every business activity of the Fintech companies would classify as a banking activity or 
other regulated activity by the national or EU rules, as was presented above. As a result, part of 
the Fintech industry is not regulated at all.135
The European Commission became aware of the potential threats that an unregulated or 
only partially regulated industry can possess to the internal market and therefore they conducted 
the  Public  Consultation  on FinTech:  a more competitive  and innovative  European financial  
sector in  2017.136 It  became apparent  from the public  consultation  that  there is  currently no 
130  See the official websites of the company Zonky s.r.o., available at: https://zonky.cz/, last accessed 20 August 
2018.
131  For  details  regarding  the  small  payment  institutions  see  parts  3.2.2 (iii.) and  3.2.4 of  this  thesis.  The 
information regarding authorisation of the company Zonky were retriever from the official websites of the 
Czech National  Bank,  available  at:  https://apl.cnb.cz/apljerrsdad/JERRS.WEB07.INTRO_PAGE?p_lang=en, 
last accessed 20 August 2018.
132  Ibid.
133  See  the  official  websites  of  the  company Twisto  payments  a.s.,  available  at:  https://www.twisto.cz/,  last 
accessed 20 August 2018.
134  The company Twisto has obtained the required permission. For details regarding payment institutions and 
definition thereof please see part 3.2.2 (i.) of this thesis. The information regarding permission of the company 
Twisto  were  retriever  from  the  official  websites  of  the  Czech  National  Bank,  available  at:  
https://apl.cnb.cz/apljerrsdad/JERRS.WEB07.INTRO_PAGE?p_lang=en, last accessed 20 August 2018.
135  One of these examples can be account information service providers that were not regulated before adoption 
of the PSD2. For details regarding AISP see part 3.3.3 of this thesis.
136  See European Commission, ‘Consultation: Public consultation on FinTech: a more competitive and innovative 
European  financial  sector’,  available  at:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/public-consultation-fintech-
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consensus between the Member States and other stakeholders regarding broad regulatory action 
in the EU. However, certain potential issues were identified, namely cybersecurity, the use and 
control of data and money laundering.137
As regards the control of data, this issue has been partially addressed by the GDPR that 
came into force on 25 May 2018 and which strengthens the data protection in the EU. Therefore, 
the Fintech companies have to adhere to the strengthened data protection and the respective rules 
regarding the data protection.
With  the  upswing  of  the  crypto-currencies,  issues  connected  with  money  laundering 
expanded to the area of these currencies. The basic framework preventing money laundering is 
given within the EU by the Directive (EU) 2015/849.138 As one of the attempts to tackle these 
problems, European legislators decided to extend the scope of this Directive (EU) 2015/849 also 
to  virtual  currencies.139 Subsequently,  European  legislators  decided  to  adopt  a  new directive 
concerning  anti-money  laundering,  which  will  include  specific  provisions  regarding  crypto-
currencies.140
The last  of  the  identified  issues  regarding cybersecurity  is  partially  addressed by the 
provisions of the PSD2 and therefore the explanation will be given further in this thesis.
The European Commission continued in its activities relating to the Fintech and prepared 
the  FinTech Action plan: For a more competitive and innovative European financial sector.141 
The pertaining issues can be seen in cybersecurity, cloud services and the use of data, while the 
European  Commission  extended  these  possible  issues  to  speculative  investments  in  crypto-
assets.142 The European Commission endeavours  to  introduce proactive  measures  in order  to 
ensure “advances in technology for the benefit  of the EU economy, citizens and industry, to  
foster a more competitive and innovative European financial sector, and to ensure the integrity  
more-competitive-and-innovative-european-financial-sector_en, last accessed 25 August 2018.
137  See  European  Commission,  ‘Summary  of  contributions  to  the  'Public  Consultation  on  FinTech:  a  more 
competitive  and  innovative  European  financial  sector’  (2017),  pp.  3-4,  available  at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-fintech-summary-of-responses_en.pdf,  last  accessed  25  August 
2018.
138 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of  
the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purposes  of  money  laundering  or  terrorist  financing,  amending 
Regulation  (EU)  No  648/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council,  and  repealing  Directive 
2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [2015] OJ 
L 141/73 (5 June 2015).
139  The Communication, op. cit. No. 128, p. 3.
140  See Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending  
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of  the financial  system for  the purposes  of  money 
laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU [2018] OJ L 156/43 
(19 June 2018). The Directive has to be implemented by the Member States by 10 January 2020.
141  The Communication, op. cit. No. 128.
142  Ibid, p. 6. 
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of  the  EU  financial  system”.143 In  order  to  do  so,  the  European  Commission  proposed  a 
regulation  allowing  crowdfunding  platforms  to  operate  cross  border  under  a  passporting 
regime.144 Another  advancements  of  the  Fintech  industry  shall  include  measures  for  remote 
identification of bank customers by cross border use of electronic identification.145
At the international level, the Fintech regulation is closely monitored by the Financial 
Stability Board which issued a report on the financial stability implications from FinTech. The 
report  identified  similar  issues  as  the  European Commission,  in  particular  issues  relating  to 
consumer and investor protection, cloud computing, data protection and cyber risks while at the 
same time it concluded that there is currently no need for an extensive regulation of the Fintech 
industry.146
Even until recently, the Fintech industry was not considered to be an important sector by 
some market  participants,  and, as a result,  the Fintech companies  did not have to adhere to 
various complex rules.147 Consequently, the Fintech companies were able to take advantage of 
this situation and the Fintech industry grew in its size. One of these examples is China that has 
emerged as one of the leaders in the Fintech industry by providing heavy investments into new 
technological  infrastructure.148 Other  countries,  including  the  UK,  Singapore  and  Australia, 
decided  to  set  up  regulatory  sandboxes  in  which  the  Fintech  companies  could  test  their 
innovative technologies.149 Particularly active in this field is the UK Financial Conduct Authority 
which  sees  the  regulatory  sandboxes  as  environments  that  allow Fintech companies  to  “test  
innovative products services and business models in a live market environment, while ensuring  
that appropriate safeguards are in place”.150
The  Fintech  companies  are  quite  often  start-up  companies  which  do  not  have  the 
necessary expertise and funds to enter the financial market. Accordingly, the sandboxes were set 
up in order to provide the Fintech companies with safe environment that is advantageous for the 
Fintech companies. As it was observed by the FCA, the potential investors are reluctant to invest 
143  Ibid, pp. 17-18.
144  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Crowdfunding Service 
Providers (ECSP) for Business COM(2018) 113 final
145  The Communication, op. cit. No. 128, p. 10
146  See Financial  Stability Board, ‘Financial Stability Implications from FinTech Supervisory and Regulatory 
Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention’ (27 June 2017), pp. 6-32, available at: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/
uploads/R270617.pdf, last accessed 25 August 2018.
147  See TEIGLAND, SIRI, LARSSON, MORENO and BOGUSZ, op. cit. No. 100, p. 4.
148  See SCARDOVI, op. cit. No. 51, pp. 207-234.
149  See e.g. TSAI, Chang-Hsien, PENG, Kuan-Jung. ‘The FinTech Revolution and Financial Regulation: The 
Case of Online Supply-Chain Financing’ (2017) Asian Journal of Law and Society, vol. 4, p. 127.
150  See  FCA,  ‘Regulatory  sandbox  lessons  learned  report’  (October  2017),  available  at: 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-lessons-learned-report.pdf,  last 
accessed 25 August 2018.
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in the Fintech companies if they do not possess the required authorisation.151 According to the 
FCA, the regulatory sandbox enables the Fintech companies to address investors who see that 
they are taking steps towards the acquisition of the authorisation. At the same time, the FCA 
praises the opportunity to explore regulatory gaps and the possibility to provide their expertise to 
the Fintech companies.152 Given that the regulatory sandboxes have proven to be successful and 
beneficial even for the regulators, thirteen other Member States have established their version of 
the regulatory sandbox.153
It follows from the previous lines that the regulators at the global level and also at the EU 
level are aware of the potential of the Fintech companies for the development of the market and 
the services provided to the customers. At the same time, the respective authorities recognize that 
these Fintech companies may cause problems and disruption to the global economy. However, it 
seems that there is currently no wide consensus concerning the necessity of a broad regulatory 
action. As a result, only piecemeal measures have been adopted at the EU level.
Given that ten years have lapsed since the Global financial crisis, regulators are not only 
focusing on how to prevent another crisis, but they are looking at ways which would support the 
future development of the market.154 Their task is definitely a difficult one: they strive to grasp 
the  rapid  development  of  the  modern  technologies  in  order  to  adapt  legal  rules  to  the 
advancement of these technologies. While doing so, they have to keep in mind potential threats 
these technologies possess,  and they also have to take into account different  interests  of the 
stakeholders. It is crucial that they put in place rules that do not hinder and create barriers for the 
development of these modern technologies and at the same time rules which protect the market 
and interests of the various stakeholders (such as consumers).
Some of the Members States understand the potential of the Fintech companies, and thus 
they do not stand idly by,  but they have taken active  steps that  support the progress of the 
Fintech industry. One of these steps can be seen in formation of the regulatory sandboxes in 
which the Fintech companies can safely grow and evolve. These regulatory sandboxes provide 
national regulators with a unique opportunity to monitor the Fintech industry and adapt their 
policies and rules based on their monitoring.
According to Cortet, Rijks and Nijland, three main forces are changing the provisions of 
financial  services  by  the  banks:  (i)  changes  in  consumer  behaviour  which  can  be  seen  in 
151  Ibid, p. 6.
152  Ibid.
153  Ibid. See also the Communication, op. cit. No. 128, pp. 8-9.
154  See ARNER, BARBERIS and BUCKLEY, op. cit. No. 47, pp. 1293-1295.
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expectations  of  the  consumers  that  they  will  be  provided  with  seamless  and  personalised 
shopping and payments,  (ii)  technology  driven innovation  that  is  particularly  caused by the 
Fintech companies and (iii) European regulatory intervention.155 Accordingly, the next chapter 
will be dedicated to the European regulatory changes and in particularly it will focus on the 
Revised payment services directive. Due to the fact that the PSD2 primarily addresses provision 
of payment services, the implications for the Fintech industry should be particularly understood 
as the potential impacts of the PSD2 on the Fintech companies that offer or provide payment 
services. 
155 CORTET,  Mounaim,  RIJKS,  Tom,  NIJLAND,  Shikko  ‘PSD2:  The  digital  transformation  accelerator  for 
banks’ (2016) Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems, vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 14-18.
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3. Payment Services Directive(s) – the foundations and key changes 
At the beginning of this chapter, the general overview of the payment system together 
with a brief explanation concerning the formation of EU rules governing the payment systems up 
to  the present  day will  be given (3.1).  The second part  will  introduce  the  original  payment 
services directive with the main important provisions in view of the fact that certain provisions 
of the PSD remained or were (slightly) amended in the PSD2 (3.2). Finally, the last part will 
focus on the changes coming along with the adoption of the PSD2 (3.3).
3.1. The basic overview of the payment system under EU law
Given that the payment systems are at the core of this part, the basic definition of these 
payments will be provided. One of the definitions is that the payment systems can be understood 
as  “institutional  arrangements  that  facilitate  the  transfer  of  funds  from debtors  (payors)  to  
creditors  (payees)  in  satisfaction  of  financial  obligations”.156 These  two  institutional 
arrangements  can  be  divided  into  two  subcategories  categories,  i.e.  retail  and  wholesale 
payments.157 Retail payments can be defined as “mass payments of small value per transaction” 
while wholesale payments can be understood as “payments of large individual  values but of  
much smaller volumes” .158 The example of the former can be a payment between two consumers 
or a consumer and a retailer whereas the example of the latter can be a payment carried out 
between two banks or between two large companies.159 Even though these two subcategories can 
be perceived as two distinctive systems, retail and wholesale payments are interconnected with 
each other, at least from an operational perspective.160 The space of this thesis precludes detailed 
analysis of each aspect of these two subcategories, and thus the following text will focus mostly 
on the retail payments and how these payments will be affected by the revised payment services 
directive.  Consequently,  certain  regulations  concerning,  for  example,  payment  clearings  and 
settlements will not be addressed.
As was already submitted in part  2.1.1 of this thesis, free movement of capital,  which 
currently covers also free movement of payments, is one of the four freedoms that are crucial for 
the proper  functioning of  the internal  market.  Originally,  free movement  of capital  and free 
156  AWREY, Dan, ZWIETEN, Kristin van. ‘The Shadow Payment System’ (2018) Journal of Corporation Law,  
vol. 43, issue 4, pp. 781-782.
157  Ibid.
158  JANCZUK-GORYWODA, Agnieszka. ‘Evolution of EU Retail Payments Law’ (2015) Tilburg Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 21/2015, p. 3.
159  Ibid.
160  See AWREY and ZWIETEN, op. cit. No. 156, p. 782.
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movement  of  payments  were  contained  in  different  articles  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European Economic Community and were perceived as different freedoms.161 However, that has 
changed with the Maastricht Treaty and nowadays free movement of capital and free movement 
of payments included in Article 63 of the TFEU are considered to be “one freedom with two 
subcategories”.162 Lenaerts, Nuffel, Bray and Cambien  consider free movement of capital and 
payments to be a “service freedom”163 given that the movement of financial values across the 
borders of Member States is closely connected with other freedoms.164
As regards the development of the rules concerning payment system at the EU level, it 
took many years before any measures have been adopted. In the period lasting until 1997, the 
measures mostly consisted of recommendations and soft law with the intention of the regulators 
to persuade the market participants to co-operate.165 The first important piece of legislation in 
this field was the Directive on cross-border credit transfer adopted in 1997.166 The main aim of 
the directive was to lay down rules regarding transparency obligations, minimum standards and 
complaints and redress.167 However, the scope of the directive was limited to the payments up to 
EUR 50.000168 and the directive was only a minimum harmonization directive.169
The turning point,  which brought about  further changes  in the regulation of payment 
systems and payment services, can be seen in the introduction of the single currency (i.e. euro) in 
1999.170 The introduction of euro was followed by the Regulation on Cross-border Payments in 
Euro  in  2001,  which  stipulated  that  the  charges  for  cross-border  and  domestic  electronic 
payments and transactions in euro shall be the same.171 Another example of the said shift from 
minimum harmonisation measures to maximum harmonisation measures is the adoption of the 
PSD in 2007. The PSD provided a comprehensive set of rules concerning payment services and 
161 The free movement of capital was included in Article 67(1) of the TEC and the free movement of payments in  
Article 106(1) of the TEC. See also HAMUĽÁK, Ondrej. ‘Unveiling the overlooked freedom – the context of 
free movement of capital and payments in the EU law’ (2012) International and Comparative Law Review,  
vol.  12,  No.  2,  pp.  129-145.  For  details  and  analysis  of  a  seminal  case-law regarding  free  movement  of 
payments  see  e.g.  LOUIS,  Jean-Victor.  ‘Free  Movement  of  Tourists  and  Freedom  of  Payments  in  the 
Community: The Luisi-Carbone Judgment’ (1984) Common Market Law Review, vol. 21, No.4, pp. 625-637.
162  See HAMUĽÁK, op. cit. No. 161, p. 133.
163  See LENAERTS, Koenraad, NUFFEL, Piet Van, BRAY, Robert and CAMBIEN, Nathan.  European Union 
Law. 3rd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Thomson Reuters, 2011, pp. 285-292.
164  See HAMUĽÁK, op. cit. No. 161, p. 144.
165  See JANCZUK-GORYWODA, op. cit. No. 158, pp. 2-9.
166  Directive 97/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 on cross-border credit  
transfer [1997] OJ L 43 (14 February 1997)
167  Ibid, Articles 3-10. 
168  Ibid, Article 1.
169  See JANCZUK-GORYWODA, op. cit. No. 158, pp. 9-10.
170  Ibid, pp. 10-11.
171  Article  3  of  the  Regulation  (EC)  No.  2560/2001 of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  19  
December 2001 on cross-border payments in euro [2001] OJ L 344 (28 December 2001).
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detailed analysis of the PSD will be given further in this chapter. Therefore, we can see a gradual 
change from a minimum harmonization to a situation in which more measures either with a 
direct effect or a maximum harmonisation were adopted.
During  the  ensuing  years,  more  regulations  with  direct  effect  and  maximum 
harmonisation directives followed.172 A new regulation concerning cross-border payments was 
adopted in 2009173 followed by a regulation that supported transition to the Single Euro Payments 
Area in 2012.174 This process culminated in adoption of the PSD2 in 2015. However, there are 
other measures that have been adopted with the aim of further advancement  of the payment 
system and relate to the PSD2, which will be briefly mentioned below. 
The first measure that closely relates to the PSD2 is the Regulation on interchange fees 
for  card-based  payment  transactions.175 This  regulation  covers  the  card-based  payment 
transactions  that are carried out within the EU and the main aim is  to impose limits  on the 
interchange fee rates.176 These interchange fee rates shall not be more than 0,2 % of the value of 
the transaction for any debit card transaction and more than 0,3 % of the value of the transaction 
for any credit card transaction.177 As Cortet, Rijks and Nijland pointed out, the average fees in 
the EU in 2013 were 0.31 % for debit cards and 0.92 % for credit cards.178, and thus we can 
notice that the regulation substantially reduces and unifies the relevant fees. The regulation is 
complemented by the PSD2 which prohibits any surcharges for the use of payment instruments 
and payment services regulated by the mentioned regulation or the SEPA regulation described 
above179.180
The following measures are connected with the payment accounts and information that 
have to accompany transfer of funds. The directive relating to the payment account focuses on, 
inter alia, possibility of EU citizens to open and maintain their bank accounts within any of the 
172  Janczuk-Gorywoda even claims that the period from 2009 can be perceived as a period of uniformity. See 
JANCZUK-GORYWODA, op. cit. No. 158, pp. 20-24.
173  Regulation (EC) No. 924/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on cross-
border payments in the Community and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001.
174  Regulation (EU) No. 260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 establishing  
technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 924/2009 [2009] OJ L 94 (30 March 2012). For details regarding the development of the SEPA see 
WANDHÖFER, Ruth. EU payments integration: the tale of SEPA, PSD and other milestones along the road. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 28-76 and 142-186.
175  Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange  
fees for card-based payment transactions [2015] OJ L 123/1 (19 May 2015).
176  Ibid, Article 1 and Recitals 12-18.
177  Ibid, Articles 3(1) and 4.
178  CORTET, RIJKS and NIJLAND, op. cit. No. 155, p. 17.
179  See the Regulation, op. cit. No. 171.
180  See Article 62(4) of the PSD2 and Recitals 2 and 66 of the PSD2.
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Member  States  and  fees  relating  to  the  payment  accounts.181 Further,  the  Regulation  on 
information  accompanying  transfers  of  funds  lays  down  certain  obligations  of  the  payment 
service providers in connection with transfer of funds which aims to prevent flows of illicit of 
money.  The  regulation  is  closely  connected  with  the  directive  regulating  anti-money 
laundering.182 All of these measures concern in a certain way the provision of payment services 
and consequently relate to the PSD2. 
The last  set  of measures  relates  to data  protection and cybersecurity.  As was already 
mentioned  above,  the  GDPR  comprehensively  regulates  processing  of  data  within  the  EU. 
Further,  the  directive  regarding  network  and  information  security183 seeks  to  obtain  a  high 
common level  of  cybersecurity  in  the  EU while  one  of  the  regulated  entities  are  the  credit 
institutions  (i.e.  banks),  which are also subject  to  the PSD2. Therefore,  also these measures 
complement the relevant provisions of the PSD2 and form the EU payments system. 
To  sum  up,  it  is  evident  from  the  provided  analysis  that  the  payment  system  was 
originally not regulated at the EU level, but the approach gradually changed and nowadays we 
can notice a comprehensive set of rules regulating the payment system at the EU level, which 
mostly consists of regulations and directives with maximum harmonization. The provided list of 
measures at the EU level is not an exhaustive list but it should provide a basic summary of the 
development  of  the  payment  system and the  measures  that  are  connected  with the  payment 
system and the PSD2. Accordingly, the following lines will focus on the PSD and PSD2. 
3.2. The original Payment Services Directive (PSD)
First of all, this part will focus on the reasons behind the adoption of the PSD (3.2.1). 
Secondly,  the  analysis  of  the  main  provisions  of  the  PSD (in  particular  focusing  on scope, 
exemptions from application and obligations of the payment services providers) will be provided 
(3.3.2). Thirdly, the significant cases handed down by the CJEU will be examined in view of the 
fact that some of them are relevant even after adoption of the PSD2 (3.3.3). The last part will 
critically assess the impacts of the PSD and provide the main reasons why the PSD2 was adopted 
(3.2.4). The main aim of this chapter is to form the basis for subsequent comparison between the 
PSD and the PSD2, which should reveal whether the changes coming along with adoption of the 
181  Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of 
fees  related  to  payment  accounts,  payment  account  switching and  access  to  payment  accounts  with basic  
features [2014] OJ L 257/214 (28 August 2014).
182  See the Directive, op. cit. No. 138 and the Directive, op. cit. No. 140.
183  Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures 
for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union [2016] OJ L 194/1 
(19 July 2016).
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PSD2 are capable of disruption of the banking system as we know it. Accordingly, only those 
provisions  of  the PSD that  were either  novel  or are  relevant  for the subsequent  comparison 
between the PSD and PSD2 are covered below.
3.2.1. Rationale behind adoption of the PSD
As was already described in chapter 3.1 above, the development of the payment system at 
the EU level  was rather slow. Each of the Member States  had its  own distinctive  rules and 
therefore the most prevalent was a piecemeal national regulation with many rules developed by 
the private entities from banking sector.184 It was argued that the protection of consumers was 
inadequate with excessive fees imposed on consumers, the market needed more competition and 
rules for provision of services within the whole EU were required.185 Accordingly, the PSD was 
adopted with the intention to tackle these issues. The main objectives, which the PSD tried to 
achieve, can be divided into four groups: (i) increased consumer protection and transparency, (ii) 
regulation  of  the  different  payment  institutions,  (iii)  setting  up  common standards,  and  (iv) 
support of SEPA.186 These objectives will be addressed in the following part which provides an 
analysis of the relevant provisions of the PSD.
3.2.2. Main provisions regarding payment services of the PSD
The PSD was adopted in the regime of full harmonisation which did not provide Member 
States with an option to fully derogate from the respective provisions of the PSD.187 However, 
the  Member  States  and  other  stakeholder  were  able  to  negotiate  twenty-three  exemptions 
included in the PSD, which allowed the Member States to derogate to a certain level from the 
provisions of the PSD.188 The same principle of full compliance applied to the payment service 
providers  with  one  exception.  The  exception  under  the  PSD  was  a  situation  in  which  the 
payment  service  providers  decided  to  grant  more  favourable  terms  to  the  payment  service 
users.189 Therefore, the permitted exceptions were only in favour of the users of the payment 
services. Member States were obliged to adapt the PSD to their respective national provisions by 
184  See VARDI, Noah. ‘Regulation of Payments after the PSD: Is There Still  a Role for Domestic Law?’ in 
GIMIGLIANO, Gabriella.  Money, payment systems and the European Union: the regulatory challenges of  
governance. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016, p. 41.
185  See MERCADO-KIERKEGAARD, Sylvia.  ‘Harmonising the regulatory regime for cross-border  payment 
services’ (2007) vol. 23, issue 2, pp. 177-187 and HARASIM and KLIMONTOWICZ, op. cit. No. 113, p. 61.
186  Ibid.
187  Article 86(1) of the PSD.
188  See WANDHÖFER, op. cit. No. 174, pp. 128-132. It is important to point out that most of the derogations 
were connected with authorisation of payment institutions in view of the fact that these institutions were a new 
concept. Details regarding payment institutions are provided below. 
189  Article 86(3) of the PSD.
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1 November 2009.190 Apart from the Member States of the EU, the PSD was applied also in the 
rest of the countries of the EEA, i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.191
As already mentioned, the PSD supported development of the SEPA by laying down a 
comprehensive set of rules governing the payment services, and thus creating a legal framework 
that formed the basis for the SEPA.192 This can be seen as one of the crucial contributions to the 
development of the payment system at the EU level.
For reasons of clarity, the provisions of the PSD will be divided into five subsections: (i) 
the  scope of  the  PSD,  (ii)  definition  of  the  payment  service  providers  under  the  PSD,  (iii)  
authorisation as a payment institution, (iv) transparency rules and (v) rights and obligations of 
the payment service users.
(i.) The scope of the PSD
The application of the PSD was limited only to the payment services provided within the 
EU while both the payment service provider of the payer and the payee or the sole payment 
services provider had to be located within the EU.193 Moreover, the applicability of the main 
provisions of the PSD concerning transparency rules and rights and obligations of the payment 
service users was limited only to the payment services made in euro or other currencies of the 
Member States outside of the euro area.194 Contrary to the original proposal of the PSD195, the 
geographical scope of the PSD was therefore limited only to transactions within the EU and 
“one-leg transactions”, i.e. transactions in which one of the payment service providers (either of 
the payer or the payee) is located outside of the EU196, were left out of the scope of the PSD.197 
What is more, the scope of the PSD was further limited only to the currencies of the Member 
States.198 Consequently, the PSD did not cover the whole area and a substantial amount of the 
payments was left out of the applicability of the PSD.
Further, the PSD included a number of explicit exclusions from the scope of the PSD. 
These exclusions include, inter alia, cash and cheque payments, payments carried out by means 
190  Article 94(1) of the PSD.
191  Application of the PSD to the whole EEA was extended by the Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 
114/2008  of  7  November  2008  amending  Annex  IX  (Financial  services)  and  Annex  XIX  (Consumer 
protection) to the EEA Agreement.
192  See HARASIM and KLIMONTOWICZ, op. cit. No. 113, p. 61.
193  Article 2(1) of the PSD.
194  Article 2(2) of the PSD.
195  Article 2(1) of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services 
in the internal market and amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2000/12/EC and 2002/65/EC COM(2005) 603 final.
196  See e.g. HARASIM and KLIMONTOWICZ, op. cit. No. 113, p. 63.
197  See e.g. MERCADO-KIERKEGAARD, op. cit. No. 185, pp. 184-185.
198  See Article 2(2) of the Proposal, op. cit. No. 195 compared with Article 2(2) of the PSD.
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of  telecommunication,  digital  or  information  technology  devices,  limited  network  payments, 
payments carried out between payment service providers, their agents or branches and between a 
parent undertaking and its branch.199 However, some of these exclusions were considered to be 
either too broad or unclear200, and thus they will be mentioned in the section regarding exclusions 
of the PSD2. 
Given that one of the main aims was to maintain existing level of consumer protection 
and subsequently strengthen this level of consumer protection201, many of the provisions of the 
PSD were designated for protection of consumers.202 Member States were entitled to extend the 
protection also to the micro enterprises203 pursuant to certain provisions of the PSD204, but the 
protection under the PSD was not extended to other enterprises, which could have deviated from 
the provisions of the PSD by an agreement, given that “consumers and enterprises are not in the  
same position”.205 Therefore,  the  scope  of  protection  under  the  PSD was  divided  into  three 
groups: consumers, which enjoyed the full protection under the PSD, micro enterprises with a 
protection dependent on the Member States and other enterprises that did not have the same level 
of protection as the consumers.
(i.) Definition of the payment service providers under the PSD
The PSD laid down six categories of service providers that were covered by the PSD, 
namely  credit  institutions  (i.e.  banks),  electronic  money  institutions206,  post  office  giro 
institutions, payment institutions, the ECB and national central banks (when not acting in their 
capacity as monetary authority or other public authorities) and Member States or their regional 
or local authorities (when not acting as public authorities).207 Most of the mentioned institutions 
199  See Article 3 of the PSD.
200  See STEENNOT, Reinhard. ‘Reduced payer's liability for unauthorized payment transactions under the second 
Payment Services Directive (PSD2)’ (2018) Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 34, issue 4, pp. 956-957.
201  See Recitals 4, 13, 22, 25-29, 33-37 and 54 of the PSD.
202  See e.g. Articles 30, 51 and 71. For the purpose of the PSD, consumer was in Article 4(11) of the PSD as “a 
natural person who, in payment service contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes other than  
his trade, business or profession“. The same definition can be found in Article 4(20) of the PSD2. 
203  The definition of the micro enterprise is given in Articles 1, 2(1) and 2(3) of the Annex to the Commission  
Recommendation of  6  May 2003 concerning  the definition of  micro,  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
[2003] OJ L 124/36 (20 May 2003), which stipulates that a micro enterprise is “an enterprise which employs  
fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2  
million”.
204  See Articles 30(1), 51(1) and 71 of the PSD.
205  Recital 20 of the PSD. The possibility to deviate from the provisions of the PSD was included in Articles 
30(1) and 51(1). According to Article 51(2) of the PSD, Member States were also entitled to exclude out-of-
court redress procedure under Article 83 of the PSD for other entities than consumers.
206  As regards electronic money institutions, Article 1(1)(b) of the PSD referred to Article 1(3)(a) of Directive 
2000/46/EC. The electronic money institutions are now defined in point (1) of Article 2 of Directive 2009/110/
EC. See e.g. the definition of electronic money institutions in Article 1(1)(b) of the PSD2.
207  See Article 1(a)-(f) of the PSD.
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were  already  regulated  to  a  certain  extent,  but  the  payment  institutions  constituted  a  new 
category of payment service providers, while this new category was established as a response to 
“the growing number of payment solutions that were emerging in parallel with the growth in  
online and mobile commerce”208.
Under the PSD, the payment institution shall mean “a legal person that has been granted  
authorisation in accordance with Article 10 to provide and execute payment services throughout  
the Community”209. Further, the payment service is defined as “any business activity listed in the  
Annex”210. Finally, the Annex to the PSD contains the list of seven relevant business activities  
that the payment institutions with appropriate authorisation are entitled to provide and execute in 
the EU. These activities  consist  of:  depositing cash and withdrawal  of cash from a payment 
account211;  execution  of  payment  transactions  in  funds212 which  are  on  a  payment  account 
(including execution of direct debits and one-off direct debit, execution of payment transaction 
through a payment card or a similar device and execution of credit transfers, including standing 
orders)213;  execution  of  payment  transaction  with  funds  that  are  covered  by  a  credit  line 
(including execution of direct debits and one-off direct debit, execution of payment transaction 
through a payment card or a similar device and execution of credit transfers, including standing 
orders)214;  issuing of payment instruments215 and acquiring of payment transactions216;  money 
remittance217;  and  execution  of  certain  payment  transactions  carried  out  by  means  of  any 
telecommunication,  digital  or IT device218.  One of the main objectives  that  the PSD tried to 
achieve by adding these payment institutions as one of the regulated payment service providers 
was to promote the competition and facilitate new market penetration by entities distinct from 
208  See CORTET, RIJKS and NIJLAND, op. cit. No. 155, p. 17.
209  Article 4(4) of the PSD.
210  Article 4(3) of the PSD.
211  See Points 1 and 2 of the Annex to the PSD. The services under the relevant provisions of the PSD also 
include “all the operations required for operating a payment account“. Article 4(14) of the PSD defined a 
payment account as “an account held in the name of one or more payment service users which is used for the  
execution of payment transactions”. The definition of the payment account remains unchanged in Article 4(12) 
of the PSD2.
212  The definition in Article 4(15) of the PSD defined funds as “banknotes and coins, scriptural money and  
electronic money as defined in Article 1(3)(b) of Directive 2000/46/EC“. The definition in Article 4(25) of the 
PSD2 is similar only with an updated reference to “point (2) of Article 2 of Directive 2009/110/EC”.
213  See Point 3 of the Annex to the PSD.
214  See Point 4 of the Annex to the PSD.
215  The PSD defined a payment instrument in Article 4(23) thereof as “any personalised device(s) and/ or set of  
procedures  agreed  between  the  payment  service  user  and the  payment  service  provider  and used  by  the  
payment service user in order to initiate a payment order”. The same definition can be found in Article 4(14) 
of  the  PSD2.  Please  see  part  3.2.3  below which  analyses  one  of  the  cases  in  which  the  CJEU provided  
interpretation of the payment instruments under the PSD.
216  See Point 5 of the Annex to the PSD.
217  See Point 6 of the Annex to the PSD.
218  See Point 7 of the Annex to the PSD.
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banks.219 The following subparagraph will further analyse the requirements for authorisation as a 
payment institution.
(ii.) Authorisation as a payment institution
Given that many of the provisions included in Title II of the PSD were technical in their 
nature, this part will provide an overview of these provisions and emphasis will be put on the 
crucial provisions included therein. 
As was already mentioned above, regulators decided to introduce a new group of payment 
service providers, i.e. payment institutions. However, it was necessary to provide a legal basis 
for these payment institutions and lay down rules for appropriate supervision. As a result, the 
payment institutions were obliged to apply for authorisation under Article 5 of the PSD. Further, 
the payment institutions had to hold at the time of authorisation initial capital, which was in the 
amount between EUR 20.000 and EUR 125.000 based on the payment services that the payment 
institution provided, they had to guarantee the level of their own funds and adhere to certain 
safeguarding measures.220 Subsequently, these payment institutions could have been authorised 
and registered to public registers of the Member States.221 
Only the payment service providers were entitled to provide payment services specified in 
the  PSD within  the  Member  States,  and  thus  authorisation  was  a  prerequisite  for  payment 
institutions to provide such services.222 The payment institutions were eligible to carry out only 
those activities relating to provision of payment services together with a limited number of other 
activities and had to adhere to additional requirements.223 The fundamental provision of the PSD 
that laid down a legal basis for exercise of the freedom to provide services within other Member 
States than the home Member State was included in Article 25 of the PSD. Pursuant to the said 
provision, the payment institutions were explicitly entitled to exercise their right of establishment 
and freedom to provide services in other Member States without any additional requirements. 224
Nevertheless, the PSD allowed Member States to waive certain conditions required for 
authorisation  of payment  institutions  for natural  and legal  persons that  were not involved in 
money laundering  or  terrorist  activities  and the  amount  of  payment  transaction  which  these 
219  See Recitals 5 and 10 of the PSD and MERCADO-KIERKEGAARD, op. cit. No. 185, p. 182.
220  See Articles 6-9 of the PSD.
221  See Articles 10-13 of the PSD.
222  See Article 29 of the PSD.
223  See Articles 14-15 and 17-19 of the PSD.
224  The payment  institutions were  obliged to  notify the competent  authorities  in  their  home Member States.  
Subsequently,  the  relevant  competent  authority  had  to  inform the  competent  authorities  in  other  Member  
States. See Article 25 of the PSD.
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persons planned to execute according to their business plan did not exceed EUR 3 million per 
month within the whole period of twelve months.225 It was possible for these persons to apply to 
be entered in the relevant  register  without the need to comply with all  the requirements  for 
authorisation.226 One of the Member States that added this exemption to its legal system was the 
Czech Republic, which included “small payment institutions” among the list of persons entitled 
to provide payment services under the Act on Payment System.227
(iii.) Transparency rules
Title  III  of  the  PSD  provided  a  comprehensive  set  of  conditions  and  information 
requirements for payment services with the intention to achieve greater transparency.228 It was 
deemed necessary for the payment service users to receive all the relevant information regarding 
the  real  costs  and  chargers  of  the  services  provided  by  the  payment  service  providers.229 
Accordingly,  the  PSD  laid  down  rules  primarily  concerning  single  payment  transactions230, 
framework contracts (including changes and possible termination thereof), information provided 
to the payment service users concerning additional charges or reductions231 and prohibition of 
charges for information provided in compliance with the PSD232.
(iv.) Rights and obligations of the payment service users
In  addition  to  transparency  rules,  the  PSD  laid  down  rules  concerning  rights  and 
obligations  of  the  payment  users  that  particularly  concerned  authorisation  and  execution  of 
payment transactions and out-of-court dispute resolutions.233 These three groups of rules will be 
analysed in the following lines.
Starting  with  the  rules  regarding  authorisation  of  payment  transactions,  the  main 
provision stipulated that “a payment transaction is considered to be authorised only if the payer  
225  See Article 26(1) of the PSD.
226  See Article 26 of the PSD.
227  See paragraph 5(i) and paragraphs 35-44 of the Act No. 284/2009 Coll., on Payment System, as amended.  
Please  note that  these small  payment  institutions were  also translated to  English as "small-scale payment  
service providers". These providers are also in the new Act on Payment System. For details see paragraph 5(i)  
and paragraphs 59-64 of the Act No. 370/2017 Coll., on Payment System.
228  See e.g. Recitals 18, 21 and 42 of the PSD.
229  See Recital 45 of the PSD. 
230  See Articles 35-39 of the PSD.
231  See Articles 40-48 of the PSD.
232  See Article 32 of the PSD.
233  See Articles 54-63 of the PSD for provisions regarding authorisation of payment transactions, Articles 64-78  
of the PSD for provisions regarding execution of payment transactions and Articles 80-83 of the PSD for 
provisions regarding out-of-court dispute resolution.
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has given  consent  to  execute  the payment  transaction”234 and such consent  could have been 
withdrawn by the payer any time, however no later than the point in time of irrevocability235. As 
a result, it was possible to revoke a payment order with a specified day of execution at the latest 
by  the  end  of  the  business  day  preceding  the  specified  day.236 The  relevant  chapter  further 
specified obligations and rights of the payment service users (e.g. notification in case of loss of a 
payment instrument, protection of a payment instrument)237 and payment service providers (e.g. 
providing possibilities to report a loss, prevention of use of a payment instrument after reported 
loss)238 especially  connected  with  the  use  of  payment  instruments  (such as  cards).239 In  this 
respect, the crucial provision for protection of consumers was Article 61 which limited liability 
of payers for unauthorised payment transaction to a maximum amount of EUR 150.240 In other 
words, if a card was stolen and the cardholder properly reported the theft, then the cardholder’s 
liability  for  unauthorised  payments  done with  the  card  was  limited  to  amount  of  EUR 150 
provided  that  the  cardholder  did  not  act  fraudulently  or  in  violation  of  one  or  more  of  his 
obligations  under  the PSD with intent  or  gross  negligence.241 Even though the  PSD did not 
provide explanation of the term “gross negligence”242, which was criticised243, the example of 
gross  negligence  relating  to  the  provided situation  would be if  the  cardholder  kept  the PIN 
password on a note together with the card.244
The  second  important  group  includes  provisions  relating  to  execution  of  payment 
transactions.  The  first  part  of  these  rules  concerned  receipt,  refusals  and  irrevocability  of 
payment  orders245 together  with  provisions  prohibiting  any additional  charges  that  were  not 
agreed, and thus ensuring that the amounts transferred and amounts received do not differ.246 The 
applicability  of  the second part  of  the rules  was limited  to  payment  transactions  in  euro,  in 
national currency of the Member States outside of the Eurozone and those payment transactions 
“involving only one currency conversion between the euro and the currency of a Member State  
outside the euro zone,  provided that  the  required currency conversion is  carried out  in  the  
234  Article 54(1) of the PSD.
235  Article 54(3) of the PSD.
236  Article 64(2) of the PSD read in conjunction with Article 66(4) thereof.
237  See Article 56 of the PSD.
238  See Article 57 of the PSD.
239  See Articles 52-63 of the PSD.
240  See Article 61(1) of the PSD.
241  See Articles 61(1), 61(2) and 61(4) of the PSD.
242  See Recitals 32 and 33 of the PSD and Articles 59(2) and 61(2) of the PSD.
243  See MERCADO-KIERKEGAARD, op. cit. No. 185, p. 182.
244  This can be evidenced by the fact that the regulators decided to mention this specific situation as an example 
of gross negligence in the PSD2. See Recital 72 of the PSD2. See also STEENNOT, op. cit. No. 200, p. 962.
245  See Articles 64-66 of the PSD.
246  See Article 67 of the PSD.
36
Member  State  outside  the  euro  area  concerned  and,  in  the  case  of  cross-border  payment  
transactions, the cross-border transfer takes place”247. For these payment transactions the PSD 
prescribed that they had to be carried out at the latest by the end of the next business day.248 
However, it was possible to prolong this period up to three business days based on an agreement 
between a payer and his payment service provider until 1 January 2012.249 The main aim of the 
provision that put in place maximum execution time was to prevent payment service providers to 
hold the funds longer than necessary.250 This section of the PSD further provided that cash placed 
on  a  payment  account  shall  be  immediately  made  available251 and  it  laid  down  provisions 
concerning liability of the payment service provider for non-execution or defective execution 
and for occurrence of other incidents252.
The last  part  connected  with the rights  and obligations  of  the payment  service  users 
contained provisions concerning dispute resolution. Under these provisions the Member States 
were obliged to establish procedural rules for interested parties (including payment service users 
and consumer association) which would allow these parties to raise their complaints concerning 
possible infringements of the rules contained in the PSD and implemented to national law of the 
Member States.253 Further, the Member States had to put in place measures for alternative dispute 
resolution (or more precisely out-of-court redress procedures) that would enable the concerned 
parties to settle their disputes without the courts’ intervention, if possible.254 
The provided analysis sought to provide a brief overview of the provisions of the PSD for 
subsequent comparison, while it also tried to present the changes and novelties that the PSD 
brought  to  EU payment  system.  One of  the  main  novelties  of  the  PSD can be  seen  in  the 
definition  of  payment  institutions  that  enabled  these  institutions  to  be  authorised  and 
subsequently  provide  the  payment  services  within  the  Member  States.  Further,  the  PSD 
consolidated rules that were previously fragmented,  and thus comprehensive set of rules that 
would protect consumers was required. The following parts will contain analysis of the case-law 
relating to the PSD and evaluation of the PSD with reasons for adoption of the PSD2.
3.2.3. Relevant case-law of the CJEU relating to the PSD
247  Article 68(1) of the PSD.
248  Article 69(1) of the PSD.
249  See Article 69(1) of the PSD.
250  HARASIM and KLIMONTOWICZ, op. cit. No. 113, p. 62.
251  Article 71 of the PSD.
252  Articles 74-78 of the PSD.
253  See Articles 81 and 82 of the PSD.
254  See Article 83 of the PSD.
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Even though the relevant case-law of the CJEU relating to the PSD is rather limited255, the 
following lines  will  provide an analysis  of three of the cases that provided interpretation of 
certain definitions of the PSD that were unclear or contested by the parties to disputes, and thus 
the CJEU had to step in and provide a binding interpretation. Given that the relevant provisions 
of the PSD that were subject to interpretation of the CJEU remain in the same wording in the 
PSD2, it is submitted that these cases are relevant even after adoption of the PSD2. 
In  T-Mobile  Austria  GmbH v.  Verein  für  Konsumenteninformation256,  the  CJEU was 
asked to interpret Articles 4(23) and 52(3) of the PSD that concerned the payment instruments 
and  charges  connected  with  these  instruments.  The  dispute  in  the  main  proceedings  arose 
between T-Mobile Austria, a provider of mobile telephone services in Austria, and Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation, an association for protection of consumers, over one of the provisions 
included in the general terms and conditions of T-Mobile.257 Pursuant to the contested provision 
of the general terms and conditions, consumers were required to pay additional monthly fee of 
EUR 3 if they decided to pay their bills by other means than credit cards and direct debits (e.g. 
by means of paper transfer orders).258 
The Verein brought  an action  in which it  sought to  prevent  the use of the contested 
provision in general terms and conditions of T-Mobile and the main proceedings came before the 
appellate court which decided to refer questions for preliminary ruling.259 First of all, the CJEU 
was  asked  whether  Article  52(3)  of  the  PSD  shall  be  applicable  to  the  use  of  payment 
instruments  in  contractual  relationship  between a  mobile  phone operator,  as  a  payee,  and a 
customer,  as  a  payer,  and  the  question  was  answered  affirmatively.260 Secondly,  the  CJEU 
interpreted  the  definition  of  a  payment  instrument  under  Article  4(23)  as  covering  “the 
procedure for  ordering transfers by means of  a  transfer order form signed by the payer  in  
person and the procedure for ordering transfers through online banking”261. The third and final 
question dealt with the power of the Member States to prohibit generally payees (such as T-
255  The search form including Case-law of the CJEU at the official websites of the CJEU retrieves only ten cases  
relating to the PSD while only four of them provide interpretation of the provisions of the PSD. See the search 
form with  list  of  results  for  the  “Directive  2007/64/EC”,  available  at:  http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
pro=&nat=or&oqp=&dates=&lg=&language=en&jur=C%2CT%2CF&cit=L%252CC%252CCJ%252CR
%252C2008E%252C%252C2007%252C64%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252Ctrue
%252Ctrue%252Ctrue&td=%3BALL&pcs=Oor&avg=&page=1&mat=or&jge=&for=&cid=209426,  last 
accessed 25 August 2018.
256  Case C-616/11, T-Mobile Austria GmbH v Verein für Konsumenteninformation [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:242.
257  Ibid, paragraphs 3-11.
258  Ibid, paragraphs 11-12.
259  Ibid, paragraphs 13-17.
260  Ibid, paragraphs 18 and 28.
261  Ibid, paragraph 44.
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Mobile) from levying charges on the payers (customers) for the use of any payment instruments, 
which was the situation in case at hand given that Austrian law prohibited additional charges.262 
The  CJEU  concluded  that  it  was  possible  for  the  Member  States  to  implement  certain 
prohibitions,  but the Member States had to consider the goals the PSD tried to achieve (i.e. 
enhanced  competition  and  efficient  use  of  payment  instruments).263 As  a  result,  the  CJEU 
essentially confirmed that the relevant provisions of the PSD applied to the case at hand and the 
Member States  are  entitled  to  prohibit  similar  additional  charges  in their  respective  national 
laws. 
The  second  case  also  involved  the  Verein  as  one  of  the  parties  to  the  original 
proceedings.264 According to the relevant provisions of the PSD, the payment service providers 
were  obliged  to  provide  payment  service  users  with  information  concerning  framework 
agreement concluded between those parties on paper or another durable medium265, which also 
included information regarding possible changes to the framework agreement.266 BAWAG PSK 
Bank für  Arbeit  und Wirtschaft  und Österreichische  Postsparkasse  AG, a  bank operating  in 
Austria, had in its general conditions and terms a provision which enabled BAWAG to deliver 
notices  and statements  to  its  customers  through special  mailboxes  located  on the  servers  of 
BAWAG.267 The  customers  of  BAWAG were  provided  with  access  to  their  online  banking 
systems,  which  included  the  dedicated  mailboxes  for  delivery  of  notices  and  statements,  in 
compliance with a framework agreement concluded between BAWAG and a customer.268 The 
Verein tried to prevent this practice and therefore it applied for an injunction.269 
The dispute was subsequently referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling concerning 
interpretation  of  durable  medium  and  possibility  to  inform  customers  about  changes  to  a 
framework agreement through similar online mailboxes.270 The CJEU came to the conclusion 
that information provided to the payment service user through the electronic mailboxes that are 
accessible via an online banking website can be considered to have been provided on a durable 
262  Ibid, paragraphs 10 and 45.
263  Ibid, paragraph 48.
264  Case C-375/15, BAWAG PSK Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft und Österreichische Postsparkasse AG v Verein  
für Konsumenteninformation [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:38.
265  Durable medium was defined in Article 4(25) of the PSD as “any instrument which enables the payment  
service user to store information addressed personally to him in a way accessible for future reference for a  
period of time adequate to the purposes of the information and which allows the unchanged reproduction of  
the information stored”. The same definition can be found in Article 4(35) of the PSD2. 
266  See Articles 41(1) and 44(1) of the PSD. 
267  See Case C-375/15, op. cit. No. 264, paragraphs 25-27.
268  Ibid.
269  Ibid, paragraph 28.
270  Ibid, paragraphs 29-33.
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medium if two conditions are met: (i) the website allows the user to store and reproduce such 
information unchanged for an adequate period without any changes to the content of information 
and (ii) there is an active behaviour or intervention from the payment service provider (such as 
the sending of a letter or e-mail to the address regularly used by the user) if the user has to access 
the website in order to obtain the relevant information.271 Consequently,  this decision can be 
perceived as a step in the right direction since the ways of communication are changing and the 
shift from paper to paperless ways of communication are in line with the development of modern 
technologies.  At the same time,  this  shift  cannot  be unrestricted,  and thus it  is  necessary to 
preserve certain safeguards, as was done in the decision handed down by the CJEU.
 The last  of the relevant  cases provided an interpretation of payment institutions that 
provide payment services consisting in services enabling cash withdrawals and relating activities 
for operating a payment account.272 The main proceedings in this case concerned Mr Rasool who 
was criminally  prosecuted in  connection  with alleged provision of payment  services without 
authorisation  through  his  company  Rasool  Entertainment  GmbH.273 Rasool  Entertainment 
operated two gaming arcades in Germany with slot machines and multifunctional terminals with 
cash.274 These multifunctional  terminals  were loaded with cash and offered the customers  of 
gaming arcades a “cash-back” option whereby they could withdraw cash together with an order 
of a voucher for EUR 20 that allowed them to put coins in the slot machines.275 The relevant 
authorities took a view that these services constituted provision of payment services, and thus 
they brought criminal proceedings against Mr Rasool given that these services were allegedly 
carried out without the required authorisation.276
Accordingly, the referring court brought preliminary questions to the CJEU in which the 
referring court was essentially asking the CJEU to assess whether these activities of Mr Rasool 
could  be  considered  as  payment  services,  and  thus  requiring  appropriate  authorisation  in 
accordance with the PSD.277 The CJEU noted that these activities of a “cash-back” were provided 
free of charge and the operations  relating  to  payment  account  (such as communication  with 
banks) were carried out by other network operator.278 Moreover, the activities carried out by 
271  Ibid, paragraph 53.
272  See Article 4(3) of the PSD read in conjunction with point 2 of the Annex to the PSD. The same definition is  
incorporated in PSD2. See Article 4(3) of the PSD2 read in conjunction with point 2 of the Annex I to the  
PSD2.
273  See paragraphs 16-20 of the Case C-568/16, Rasool Entertainment GmbH and Staatsanwaltschaft Stuttgart v  
Faiz Rasool [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:211.
274  Ibid, paragraphs 16 and 18.
275  Ibid, paragraph 19.
276  Ibid, paragraph 20.
277  Ibid, paragraph 29.
278  Ibid, paragraphs 32-33.
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Rasool  Entertainment  primarily  concerned of  gaming arcades  and other  activities  were  only 
ancillary to this activity that was considered to be a main activity of Rasool Entertainment.279 
Therefore, the CJEU concluded that the activities carried out by Rasool Entertainment, which 
included a cash withdrawal service offered by the mentioned gaming arcade operator, cannot be 
considered as payment services within the meaning of the PSD.280 
The above-mentioned case-law provided clarity  to certain definitions  stipulated in the 
PSD that were rather unclear. Moreover, the CJEU provided in BAWAG281 the interpretation of 
the term “durable medium” which contributes to the development connected with the upswing of 
modern technologies  and modern ways of communication.  Given that  these cases concerned 
definitions whose wording remained unchanged in the PSD2 and that these cases were handed 
down by the CJEU quite recently (one of them even on 22 March 2018)282, it is argued that the 
interpretation provided by the CJEU will be relevant even after adoption of the PSD2.
3.2.4. Evaluation of the PSD followed by a decision to adopt a new directive 
As  early  as  in  June  2010,  we  can  notice  the  first  consultations  concerning  possible 
necessity of a revised version of the PSD.283 These consultations were followed by the General 
report  on  the  transposition  by  the  Member  States284 in  2011,  which  represented  a  first 
comprehensive document mapping the implementations of the PSD in the Member States. 
The General report  remarked that the implementations of the PSD did not create  any 
major issues to the Member States.285 However, the General report observed that one of the main 
issues concerned Article 2 of the PSD relating to the scope of the PSD, because some of the 
Member States did not fully adhere to the wording of the PSD and extended the scope also to the 
one-leg transactions.286 Further, not all  the definitions included in Article 4 of the PSD were 
properly implemented to the national legislation of the Member States and provisions concerning 
application  for  authorisation,  own  funds  calculation  and  use  of  agents,  branches  and  other 
279  Ibid, paragraphs 35-38.
280  Ibid, paragraph 39.
281  Case C-375/15, op. cit. No. 264.
282  Case C-568/16, op. cit. No. 273.
283  See ROMĀNOVA, GRIMA and SPITERI, op. cit. No. 113, p. 7.
284  See Tipik Communication Agency S.A, ‘Directive 2007/64/EC: General report on the transposition by the 
Member  States’  (August  2011),  available  at:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/psd-transposition-study-
report-31082011_en.pdf, last accessed 24 August 2018.
285  Ibid, p. 4.
286  Ibid,  p.  4.  One-leg transactions  are  those transactions  in  which  one  of  the payment  service  providers  is 
domiciled outside of the EU. For details see part 3.2.2(i) of this thesis. 
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entities287 caused a minor  issues  during the implementation.288 Therefore,  some of the issues 
included in the PSD came to the surface. 
After the General report, the European Commission drafted the Green Paper: ‘Towards  
an integrated European market for card, internet and mobile payments’  in which it identified 
certain obstacles for the development of markets with card, internet and mobile payments and 
raised a number of questions that were intended for the stakeholders in the relevant markets.289 
The Green Paper was followed by the  Feedback statement that included an overview of the 
responses  from  the  relevant  stakeholders.290 The  Green  Paper  together  with  the  Feedback 
statement concluded that the legislation concerning payment services still remained fragmented 
and  that  there  was  still  a  room for  improvement  in  areas  such as  protection  of  consumers, 
transparency, surcharging, standardization and interoperability  and payment security.291 These 
two  documents  were  followed  by  a  resolution  from the  European  Parliament  in  which  the 
European Parliament analysed some of the issues and called for a better regulation of the card, 
internet and mobile payments.292
These  early  examinations  of  the  market  with  payment  services  were  subsequently 
supplemented by the detailed Study on the Impact of the PSD in 2013 that was commissioned by 
the European Commission.293 While the Study on the Impact of the PSD conceded that the PSD 
contributed to the development of the market with payment services, it also pointed out that only 
some of its general goals were reached.294 Further, the Study on the Impact of the PSD mentioned 
that  it  recorded 568 payment institutions  and 2,203 institutions that were registered as small 
payment services providers as of September 2012.295 At the same time, the Study on the Impact 
287  Articles 5, 8 and 17 of the PSD.
288  See The General Report, op. cit. No. 284, p. 5. 
289  See  Green  Paper:  ‘Towards  an  integrated  European  market  for  card,  internet  and  mobile  payments’  
COM(2011) 941 final.
290  See  European  Commission,  ‘Feedback  statement  on  European  Commission  Green  Paper  “Towards  an 
integrated  European  market  for  card,  internet  and  mobile  payments”’  (June  2012),  available  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/docs/cim/gp_feedback_statement_en.pdf,  last  accessed  24 
August 2018.
291  See the Green Paper, op. cit. No. 289, pp. 2-19 and the Feedback statement, op. cit. No. 290, pp. 3-30.
292  See European Parliament resolution of 20 November 2012 on ‘Towards an integrated European market for 
card, internet and mobile payments’ OJ C 419/19.
293  See iff, London Economics and PaySys, ‘Study on the Impact of Directive 2007/64/EC on Payment Services 
in the Internal Market and on the Application of Regulation (EC) No. 924/2009 on Cross-Border Payments in 
the Community’ (February 2013), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/docs/framework/
130724_study-impact-psd_en.pdf, last accessed 24 August 2018. European Commission was required to carry 
out the review pursuant to Recital 37 and Articles 54 and 87 of the PSD.
294  Ibid, pp. IX and 268-269.
295  Ibid, pp. 269-270. Small payment institutions are those institutions that were registered pursuant to Article 26 
of the PSD. These institutions did not have to adhere to all  the conditions required for authorisation as a  
payment institution under Article 5 of the PSD provided that the respective Member State waived some of 
these conditions in their respective national law. The same exemption can be found in Article 32 of the PSD2.
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of  the  PSD stressed  that  about  three  fourths  of  the  payment  institutions  had  provided  their 
services even before the date when the PSD was adopted, and thus the PSD did not contribute to 
the growth of the payment institutions as originally expected.296 However, it was noted that the 
PSD and the possibilities of passporting supported innovation by enabling payment institutions 
to access markets previously beyond their reach.297 
In conclusion, the Study on the Impact of the PSD brought several findings that may be 
divided into four groups including main findings for the subsequent development: (i) the market 
and regulation thereof remained fragmented even after adoption of the PSD and there were new 
market entrants that were not regulated (such as payment initiation services)298; (ii) the scope of 
the PSD needed revision (especially with regard to “one-leg transactions”) and exceptions from 
the scope were too broad299; (iii) passporting contributed to the development of the market with 
payment  services  but  it  was  necessary  to  lay  down  more  precise  provisions  governing 
passporting300 and  (iv)  the  rules  concerning  fees  and  charges  of  payment  required  further 
clarification301.
Therefore, it became apparent that the regulation of the payment services governed by the 
PSD required a revision given that not all of the goals set up by the PSD were achieved and rapid 
technological  development  brought  about  changes  which  needed  to  be  addressed.302 The 
European  Commission  was  well  aware  of  those  issues  identified  in  the  above-mentioned 
documents and with that in mind it prepared a draft of a new directive on payment services.303
After consultations and amendments to the draft of the directive, the PSD2 was adopted 
and  published  in  December  2015  and  pursuant  to  Article  115(1)  thereof  it  required  to  be 
implemented into the national law of the Member States by 13 January 2018. However, it should 
be briefly mentioned at this point that four of the Member States have not yet transposed the 
PSD2  into  their  national  laws  and  not  all  the  required  supplementary  measures  have  been 
adopted in time (or were adopted with the postponed date of entry into force), which have caused 
296  Ibid, p. 270.
297  Ibid, pp. X and 270-271.
298  Ibid, pp. 15-47
299  Ibid, pp. VII-VIII and XIII-XVI, 94-173 and 274-275.
300  Ibid, pp. X, 174-218.
301  Ibid, pp. XI-XIII and 48-93
302  See NOCTOR, Mark. ‘PSD2: Is the banking industry prepared?’ (2018) Computer Fraud & Security, vol.  
2018, issue 6, pp. 9-11, VARDI, op. cit. No. 184, p. 49, HARASIM and KLIMONTOWICZ, op. cit. No. 113,  
p. 62.
303  See Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a  
directive  of  the  European  parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  payment  services  in  the  internal  market  and 
amending  Directives  2002/65/EC,  2013/36/UE and 2009/110/EC and repealing  Directive  2007/64/EC and 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on interchange fees for card-based  
payment transactions SWD(2013) 288 final, pp. 7-36.
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certain delays with the application of the PSD2, as will be further explained in part  4.2 of this 
thesis
The PSD2 was adopted with the aim to tackle the issues identified in the reports and 
studies on implementation of the PSD, while it aims to: close the regulatory gaps and provide 
more  certainty;  enhance  protection  of  the  consumers;  help  to  achieve  more  integrated  and 
efficient internal market; lower prices and fees for payments and stimulate the competition by 
opening  the  market  to  the  Fintech  companies.304 Accordingly,  the  next  part  will  provide  an 
analysis of the changes that are coming along with adoption of the PSD2.
3.3.  The revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2)
The PSD2 contains six titles and two annexes. The first title focuses on subject matter,  
scope and main definitions used in the PSD2.305 Further, the second title contains rules governing 
payment  service  providers  and  these  articles  especially  lay  down  provisions  regarding 
authorisation of payment institutions and exemption from authorisation.306 Furthermore, Title III 
deals with transparency of conditions and information requirements for payment services.307 Title 
IV addresses rights and obligations in relation to the provisions and use of payments services.308 
Title V contains provision regarding delegated acts and regulatory technical standards.309 The last 
title  contains  final  provisions,  such  as  provisions  concerning  full  harmonisation  and 
transposition.310 Annex I lists the payment services and Annex II contains correlation table of the 
provisions of the PSD and PSD2.
As was already mentioned, many of the provisions contained in the PSD2 are similar to 
the provisions of the PSD, and thus the analysis contained in 3.2.2 of this thesis is still relevant 
even after adoption of the PSD2. It is not the purpose of this thesis to provide an exhaustive list 
and description of all the provisions that have been amended or added to the PSD2. Therefore, 
only those provisions that are crucial for subsequent development or significantly improve the 
previous wording of the PSD will be mentioned.
Accordingly, the following text will be divided into six subsections. The first part will  
describe the scope of the PSD2 together with the amended list of exclusions (3.3.1). Two new 
304  See Recitals 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 19, 28, 29, 35, 55, 58 and 63 of the PSD2.
305  See Title I, Articles 1-4 of the PSD2.
306  See Title II, Articles 5-37 of the PSD2.
307  See Title III, Articles 38-60 of the PSD2.
308  See Title IV, Article 61-103 of the PSD2.
309  See Title V, Articles 104-106 of the PSD2.
310  See Title VI, Articles 107-117.
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payment services that were added to the list of permitted payment services under the PSD2, i.e. 
payment initiation service and account information service, will be described in parts 3.3.2 and 
3.3.3, respectively. The provisions focusing on security measures will be addressed in part 3.3.4 
and this part will be followed by an analysis of the provisions that were adopted in order to 
enhance consumer protection (3.3.5). In addition, the crucial role of the EBA and the measures 
that the EBA has adopted will be mentioned in part 3.3.6. 
3.3.1.  The scope of the PSD2 and exclusions from applicability of the PSD2
After the criticism regarding the scope of the PSD and especially the omission of the 
“one-leg transactions” from the scope thereof311, the regulators decided to fix this problem in the 
PSD2 by adding these transactions to the scope of the PSD2.312 The criticism primarily tried to 
draw attention to the fact that the payment services consisting in money remittance carried out by 
immigrants and migrant workers, who are considered to be a vulnerable group of the consumers, 
that were sending funds to the countries outside of the EEA were not covered by the scope of the 
PSD.313 
Therefore, Article 2(4) of the PSD2 now stipulates that the provisions of the PSD2 shall 
apply  to  “payment  transactions  in  all  currencies  where  only  one  of  the  payment  service  
providers is located within the Union, in respect to those parts of the payment transaction which  
are carried out in the Union”, while the PSD2 excludes application of certain provisions thereof, 
such  as  provisions  governing  possible  refunds  and  information  duty  regarding  maximum 
execution time.314 Moreover, the scope of the PSD2 was extended to transactions carried out by 
payment service providers (of the payer and the payee) or the sole payment service provider 
located within the EU irrespective of the currency, i.e. the scope was extended to transactions 
carried out in other currencies than only the currencies of the Member States provided that the 
payment service providers or the sole payment service provider are located within the EU.315 
The PSD2 was adopted as a full  harmonisation directive316 and it  seeks to reduce the 
number of options of the Member States to derogate from the provisions of the PSD2 given that 
311  See the part 3.2.4 of this thesis.
312  See Article 2 of the PSD2.
313  See DONNELLY, Mary. ‘Payments in the digital market: Evaluating the contribution of Payment Services 
Directive II’ (2016) Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 32, issue 6, p. 830, and also the Study on the 
Impact of the PSD, op. cit. No. 293, pp. XIV and 141-148.
314  See Article 2(4) of the PSD2. This provision explicitly excludes application of Articles 45(1)(b), 52(2)(e),  
52(5)(g), 56(a), 62(2), 62(4), 76, 77, 81, 83(1), 89 and 92 of the PSD2.
315  See Article 2(3) of the PSD2. The said provision also excludes application of certain provisions of the PSD2. 
316  See Article 107 of the PSD2.
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the PSD and the options to derogate therefrom were subject to a criticism.317 One of these options 
that was not taken over to the PSD2 is Article 41 of the PSD2 that explicitly prescribes that in a 
case where there is a dispute whether the payment service provider complied with its information 
requirements stipulated in the PSD2, then the burden of prove lies with the payment service 
provider.318 However,  a  few new options  were  added to  the  PSD2,  and thus  the  PSD2 still  
contains many options of the Member States or their competent authorities to derogate from the 
provisions of the PSD2. As a result, the total number of these options amounts to twenty-three319, 
which is the same number of options as under the PSD.320 At the same time, it is necessary to 
point out that the wording of some of these options was amended in order to provide a greater 
legal certainty.321
Further,  the PSD2 contains  a limited number of explicit  exclusions from its  scope.322 
Some of these exclusions, such as exclusion concerning payments in cash and cheques, did not 
cause any concerns, and thus they were taken over from the PSD to the PSD2 in their original 
wording.323 Nevertheless, the exclusion relating to limited networks, payment transactions made 
through a commercial agent and payment transactions executed by means of telecommunication, 
digital or IT devices cause issues in connection with their interpretation or were considered to be 
too broad, and therefore revision was required.324
As regards  the limited  network exclusions,  the PSD2 amended the original  provision 
included in the PSD, and therefore this  exclusion shall  apply to  “services  based on specific  
payment instruments that can be used only in a limited way”, which at the same time must meet 
one of three additional conditions.325 According to the PSD2, this exclusion will cover fuel cards, 
public  transport  card and certain  specific  meal  vouchers,  while  the  PSD2 specifies  that  this 
exclusion should be interpreted in a strict way.326 Even though the limited network exclusion was 
clarified in the PSD2, there are still concerns regarding interpretation of this exclusion given that 
317  See DONNELLY, op. cit. No. 313, p. 829 and the part 3.2.4 of this thesis.
318  Compare Article 41 of the PSD2 with Article 33 of the PSD. According to Article 33 of the PSD, the Member  
States were entitled to stipulate that the burden of proof lies with the payment service provider, but it was not a  
mandatory provision.
319  Even though Article 107(1) of the PSD2 includes only fifteen explicit derogations, we will get to a higher  
number if we follow the method of calculation mentioned in WANDHÖFER, op. cit. No. 174, pp. 128-132.  
These options to derogate from the provisions of the PSD2 can be found in Articles 2(5), 8(3), 24(3), 29(2),  
29(4), 32(1), 32(4), 38(2), 42(2), 55(6), 57(3), 58(3), 61(2), 61(3), 62(5), 63(2), 63(3), 74(1), 76(4), 86, 101(2), 
109(2) and 109(4) of the PSD2.
320  For details please see part 3.2.2 of this thesis.
321  Compare Article 74(1) of the PSD2 with Article 61(3) of the PSD.
322  See Article 3 of the PSD2. 
323  Compare Articles 3(a) and 3(g) of the PSD2 with Articles 3(a) and 3(g) of the PSD.
324  See DONNELLY, op. cit. No. 313, pp. 831-832.
325  Please see Article 3(k) of the PSD2 for the additional conditions. 
326  See Recitals 13 and 14 of the PSD2.
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the PSD2 uses the wording such as “a very limited range of goods”327 that may cause issues 
concerning the interpretation.328
The  second  exclusion  concerning  payment  transactions  made  through  a  commercial 
agent, which was governed by Article 3(b) of the PSD, raised concerns in connection with the 
term “agent”, because it was not clear whether the exclusion applied in a situation in which the 
agent acted on behalf of the payer or payee or on behalf of both of them.329 Consequently, the 
PSD2 explicitly  provides that this exclusion applies only if there is an agreement between a 
commercial agent and a payee or a payer, whereas the commercial agent is entitled to act on 
behalf only the payer or the payee.330
The  last  exclusion  that  was  substantially  altered  is  the  exclusion  initially  covering 
payment transactions executed by means of telecommunication, digital or IT devices, which was 
included in Article 3(l) of the PSD. Originally, this exclusion covered purchases of ringtones and 
premium SMS services that were charged to the customer together with other services provided 
by the  operator.331 However,  this  exclusion  was  considered  to  be  too  broad and  there  were 
suggestions that this exclusion could be extended to a general commerce, which would endanger 
the  level  playing  field.332 Even  though  these  concerns  never  materialized,  it  was  deemed 
necessary to modify this exclusion.333 Therefore, the exclusion has been revised and the wording 
was amended in order to provide a legal certainty for consumers and operators.334
As a result, the revised wording of the exclusion primarily focuses on micro-payment for 
digital  content  and voice-based services.335 The  respective  provision  stipulates  that  from the 
scope of the PSD2 certain payment transactions which are offered by providers of electronic 
communication networks or additional services provided by these providers shall be excluded.336 
These  payment  transactions  include  purchases  of  digital  content  and  voice-based  services, 
irrespective of the device that is used for that purchase and other payment transactions that are 
carried out through electronic devices as a payment for the purchase of tickets or within the 
327  See Article 3(k)(ii).
328  For details regarding the concerns relating to interpretation of this exclusion see e.g. STEENNOT, op. cit. No. 
200, pp. 956-957.
329  See the Study on the Impact of the PSD, op. cit. No. 293, pp. 125-126, and DONNELLY, op. cit. No. 313, pp. 
831-832.
330  See Article 3(b) of the PSD2.
331  See Recital 15 of the PSD2.
332  See the Study on the Impact of the PSD, op. cit. No. 293, pp. 122-124.
333  See STEENNOT, op. cit. No. 200, p. 958, and DONNELLY, op. cit. No. 313, p. 832.
334  See Recital 15 of the PSD2.
335  See Recital 16 of the PSD2.
336  See Article 3(l) of the PSD2.
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scheme of a charitable activity.337 At the same time these payments are limited by an amount of 
EUR 50 per any single payment transaction and by the cumulative amount of EUR 300 per 
month.338 Examples of this exclusion can be payments for car parking, transport and entry to 
various venues.339 Given that this exclusion covers micro-payments in video games that may be 
played by minors, which are considered to be a vulnerable group of consumers, it was argued 
that  threshold of  daily  and monthly  limits  could have been set  even lower than  the  current 
amounts.340
To  conclude,  the  scope  of  the  PSD2  was  amended  in  line  with  the  proposals  for 
improvement that were made in connection with revisions of the PSD. However, the number and 
extent  of  options  for  Member  States  or  their  competent  authorities  to  derogate  from  the 
provisions of the PSD2 did not substantially change and therefore it remains to be seen whether 
the desired level of harmonisation will be achieved. Further, the exclusions from the scope of the 
PSD were amended in the PSD2 in order to ensure greater legal certainty. In general, these steps 
can be welcomed, but there are still certain concerns that will be subject to further discussions 
and possible interpretation by the CJEU.
337  See Articles 3(l)(i) and 3(l)(ii) of the PSD2. The payment transactions must be charged to the related bill of a  
subscriber.
338  See Article 3(l) of the PSD2. The cumulative amount of EUR 300 per month shall also apply if a subscriber 
pre-funds its account.
339  See Recitals 15 and 16 of the PSD2.
340  See DONNELLY, op. cit. No. 313, p. 832, and STEENNOT, op. cit. No. 200, p. 958.
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3.3.2. Payment Initiation Service 
Some  of  the  authors  consider  payment  initiation  service  providers  and  account 
information service providers, which are collectively described as “third party payment service  
providers”341, as one of the most important innovations that is coming along with adoption of the 
PSD2.342 However, it must be pointed out that these providers are not entirely new, but they were 
not regulated at the EU level, which ended with adoption of the PSD2 that has established legal 
framework for these providers.343
Starting with payment initiation service, the respective definition provides that payment 
initiation service means “a service to initiate a payment order at the request of the payment  
service user with respect to a payment account held at another payment service provider”344 and 
the  providers  of  these  services  are  PISP345.  In  other  words,  this  provider  can  be  seen  as  a 
“software bridge” between the merchant and the customer’s bank which initiates a credit transfer 
from the customer’s bank.346 The following image represents a basic overview of the flow of 
information relating to a payment transaction in which the PISP is engaged together with other 
participants:347
341  See e.g. SANTAMARÍA, Javier. ‘The emergence of new payment service providers and their impact on the 
regulatory and market environment’ (2014) Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems, vol. 8, No. 4, p. 407.
342  See e.g. HATFIELD, Jacqui. ‘Innovation in payments and the revised Payments Services Directive’ (2017) 
Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems, vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 78-80 and CORTET, RIJKS and NIJLAND, op. 
cit. No. 155, pp. 17-20.
343  See SANTAMARÍA, op. cit. No. 341, p. 409, Recital 93 of the PSD2 and the Study on the Impact of the PSD, 
op. cit. No. 293, pp. 105-113. This can be also inferred from the fact that the PSD2 in Article 115(5) furnishes 
the payment initiation service providers and account information service providers that were active before 12 
January 2016 with the transitional period in which they can continue to perform their activities.
344  See Article 4(15) of the PSD2.
345  Abbreviation that represents payment initiation service providers. See Article 4(18) of the PSD2.
346  Recital 27 of the PSD2.
347  The customer decides to acquire goods or services from the merchant. Subsequently, the customer instructs its  
PISP to initiate a payment transaction. PISP contacts customer’s bank with details provided by the customer  
and the banks confirms the payment instructions. PISP then informs the merchant. It is necessary to stress that  
PISP providing only payment initiation services shall not at any point of time hold the funds (Article 66(3)(a) 
of the PSD2). The funds shall be directly transferred from customer’s bank to the merchant’s bank. Source of  
the image: ‘The Impacts of PSD2 on the E.U. Payments Landscape Will It Change The Way We Pay?’ (23 
May  2018),  Global  Payments  Inc.,  available  at: 
https://www.globalpaymentsinc.com/en-ie/accept-payments/ecommerce/blog/2018/05/23/the-impacts-of-psd2-
on-the-eu-payments-landscape-will-it-change-the-way-we-pay, last accessed 25 August 2018.
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The payment transaction with the involvement of PISP usually began with customer that 
was redirected to PISP’s website.348 On these websites the customer had to fill in log in details to 
its  online  banking.349 These  details  were  authenticated,  and  the  customer  was  subsequently 
provided  with  a  payment  form  that  was  pre-filled  with  details  regarding  the  payment 
transaction.350 Once the payment was authorized, PISP informed the customer and the merchant 
and  the  amount  was  transferred  from  customer’s  bank  to  merchant’s  bank.351 As  a  result, 
customers do not have to possess payment cards in order to buy goods from merchants and these 
PISP provide conform to the parties that the payment has been initiated, and thus the merchant 
has a strong incentive to immediately send the goods to the customer.352
Accordingly,  PISP  were  provided  with  their  respective  legal  framework  and  these 
services  now  have  to  apply  for  authorisation  if  they  want  to  provide  payment  initiation 
348  See DONNELLY, op. cit. No. 313, p. 830.
349  Ibid.
350  See STEENNOT, op. cit. No. 200, p. 955.
351  Ibid.
352  See Recital 29 of the PSD2.
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services.353 Even though PISP are considered only as a medium risk in relation to the initial 
capital, they have to hold the initial capital of at least EUR 50,000 at the time of authorisation. 354 
The provisions concerning the requirement to hold certain amount of own funds do not apply to 
PISP,  but  PISP  are  required  to  hold  a  professional  indemnity  insurance.355 As  regards  the 
minimum  monetary  amount  that  this  insurance  has  to  cover,  the  EBA  prepared  guidelines 
concerning the criteria how to stipulate the appropriate amount.356
Further, PISP have to adhere to a number of obligations laid down by the PSD2. If PISP 
purely provides the services of payment initiation services, then they shall not hold the user’s 
funds at any point of time.357 PISP can perform their activities only with explicit consent of their 
user358 and they have a number of obligations towards their users, especially in connection with 
protection of sensitive payment data and user’s credentials.359 Moreover,  PISP are obliged to 
apply strong customer authentication, which will be described below, in a case that they initiate 
an electronic payment transaction.360
In order to protect  the users of PISP, the PSD2 tries to strike a balance between the 
possibility  to  provide  payment  initiation  services  without  obstructions  and  protection  of  the 
users.361 As a result, PSD2 demands that the burden of proof in a case that a user claims that the 
payment transaction was not properly executed or authorised shall  rest with PISP.362 What is 
more, the users shall be immediately refunded, and in any case no later than by the end of the 
following business day, for unauthorised payments by their account servicing payment service 
provider363 (usually  represented  by  their  banks)  in  a  case  that  the  payment  transaction  was 
353  Article 5(2) of the PSD2.
354  See Recital 34 of the PSD2 and Article 7(b) thereof.
355  See Recital 35 of the PSD2 and Article 9(1) thereof.
356  See ‘Final  Report:  Guidelines  on the criteria  on how to stipulate the minimum monetary amount  of  the  
professional  indemnity  insurance  or  other  comparable  guarantee  under  Article  5(4)  of  Directive  (EU) 
2015/2366  (PSD2)’  (7  July  2017),  European  Banking  Authority,  available  at: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1901998/Final+Guidelines+on+PII+under+PSD2+%28EBA-GL-
2017-08%29.pdf, last accessed 23 August 2018.
357  See Recital 31 of the PSD2 Article 66(3)(a) thereof.
358  Article 64 of the PSD2 read in conjunction with Article 66 thereof.
359  Pursuant to Article 4(32) of the PSD2, sensitive payment data means “data, including personalised security  
credentials which can be used to carry out fraud. For the activities of payment initiation service providers and  
account  information  service  providers,  the  name  of  the  account  owner  and  the  account  number  do  not  
constitute sensitive payment data”. Some of the main obligations of PISP are laid down in Articles 45, 46, 64, 
66(3) of the PSD2.
360  See Article 97(4) of the PSD2.
361  See Recital 73 of the PSD2.
362  Article 72 of the PSD2.
363  Article  4(17) of the PSD2 defines  an account  servicing payment service provider  as “a payment  service  
provider providing and maintaining a payment account for a payer”. The definition was not included in the 
PSD, but it was added to the PSD2 in order to clarify the terms of the PSD2 in connection with adoption of  
PISP and AISP.
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initiated by PISP.364 The same principle applies in relation to non-execution, defective or late 
execution of payment transactions.365
It follows from the previous lines that the legal relationship between PISP and AS PSP is 
important for the provisions of payment initiation services. However, the PSD2 stipulates that 
there does not have to be a contractual relationship between PISP and AS PSP.366 AS PSP shall 
provide  PISP  with  an  access  to  payment  accounts  and  this  access  may  be  denied  only  in 
objectively  justified  and  duly  evidenced  cases  in  which  AS  PSP  assume  unauthorised  or 
fraudulent access to payment accounts.367 If AS PSP decide to deny access on the grounds of the 
said reasons, then they have to immediately report the incident to competent authorities.368 The 
high threshold justifying refusal of access together with an obligation to report the incident to a 
competent authority are designed to discourage abuse of this possibility to deny access by AS 
PSP. Further details concerning the possibility to access payment accounts by PISP will be given 
in the next part.
3.3.3.  Account Information Service 
The second  group of  services  that  were  added  to  the  PSD2 are  account  information 
services.369 The  account  information  services  are  defined  as  “an  online  service  to  provide  
consolidated information on one or more payment accounts held by the payment service user  
with either another payment service provider or with more than one payment service provider”370 
and the respective providers are AISP371. In other words, AISP represent innovative companies 
that  provide  their  customers  with  a  comprehensive  overview of  either  one  or  more  of  their 
payment accounts (usually various bank accounts) held with other payment service providers, 
which  are  accessed  through  an  online  interface.372 These  companies  often  provide  ancillary 
services, such as recommendation concerning possible money savings.373 The following image 
364  Article 73(2) of the PSD2. At the same time, Article 73(2) of the PSD2 provides that PISP shall immediately 
compensate the account servicing payment service provider if PISP is liable for that unauthorised payment  
transaction.
365  Article 90 of the PSD2.
366  See Recital 30 of the PSD2 and Article 66(4) of thereof.
367  Article 68(5) of the PSD2.
368  Article 68(6) of the PSD2.
369  See point 8 of Annex I to the PSD2.
370  Article 4(16) of the PSD2.
371  Abbreviation that represents account information service providers. See Article 4(19) of the PSD2.
372  See Recital 28 of the PSD2.
373  See DONNELLY, op. cit. No. 313, p. 831. These services were also mentioned in part 2.2 of this thesis. See 
also footnote No. 107 above.
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represents how information are transferred between the customer, AISP and customer’s bank in 
an example with various bank accounts:374 
Account information services and rules governing possible provision of these services are 
quite  similar  to  rules  concerning  payment  initiation  services.375 Due  to  the  nature  of  these 
services, AISP are to a large extent exempted from the general provisions of the PSD2.376 As a 
result, AISP are not obliged to possess any initial capital or adhere to the requirements regarding 
own funds, but they have to hold a professional indemnity insurance.377 Moreover, AISP are not 
a subject to an authorisation procedure as other payment institutions, but they have to apply for 
registration  to  provide  their  services.378 Nevertheless,  AISP  shall  be  treated  as  payment 
institutions (with the exception of a number of provisions of the PSD2), which entitles them to 
374  Source of the image: ‘The Impacts of PSD2 on the E.U. Payments Landscape Will It Change The Way We 
Pay?’ (23 May 2018), Global Payments Inc., available at:  https://www.globalpaymentsinc.com/en-ie/accept-
payments/ecommerce/blog/2018/05/23/the-impacts-of-psd2-on-the-eu-payments-landscape-will-it-change-the-
way-we-pay, last accessed 23 August 2018.
375  See Recitals 27-30 of the PSD2.
376  See Article 33 of the PSD2.
377  See Articles 5(3), 7 and 33 of the PSD2.
378  See Article 5(3) of the PSD2.
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benefit from a limited number of general provisions of the PSD2, such as provisions concerning 
passporting.379
AISP shall be entitled to provide their services only if they obtain an explicit consent of 
their  users380 and  they  have  similar  obligations  towards  their  users  as  PISP,  including  data 
protection and information obligations.381 In a situation that AISP provide exclusively account 
information services they should not hold any funds of their users.382 Given that AISP do not 
initiate  any payments,  the  PSD2 does  not  include  any provisions  concerning  their  potential 
liability in connection with unauthorised payment transactions. 
As regards relationship between AISP and AS PSP, the situation is similar as with PISP, 
and therefore AISP do not have to enter into a contractual relationship with AS PSP in order to 
be eligible to provide account information services.383 At the same time, AS PSP may in special 
circumstances deny access of AISP to payment accounts.384
Traditionally, AISP and PISP could gain an access to payment accounts of their users 
primarily by two methods.385 The first method included the user’s login and password details for 
access to payment accounts that were directly provided to AISP and PISP.386 Subsequently, AISP 
and  PISP  used  these  details  to  log  onto  user’s  account  through  websites  of  the  respective 
payment service provider in a process that was commonly called “screen scaping”.387 The second 
method  was  through  a  dedicated  interface  called  “application  programme interface“,  which 
enabled  AISP and PISP to  access  and use  payment  accounts  through these  special  APIs.388 
Nevertheless, the payment service providers (and especially banks) were not obliged to provide 
AISP and PISP with a direct access to their account or access to their APIs.389 This has changed 
with adoption of the PSD2.390
379  See Article 33(2) of the PSD2 read in conjunction with Article 28 thereof. See also Recital 48 of the PSD2. 
The space precludes to elaborate on the topic of passporting, but for the purpose of this thesis it suffices to 
point out that the PSD2 properly improved the process concerning passporting. For details compare Article 28 
of the PSD2 with Article 25 of the PSD.
380  Article 67(2)(a) of the PSD2.
381  For details see Article 67(2) of the PSD2.
382  See Recital 35 of the PSD2. However, the PSD2 does not include similar provision as Article 66(3)(a) of the 
PSD2 that explicitly prohibits PISP to hold any funds. This stems from the fact that AISP (unlike PISP) do not  
initiate any payment transactions.
383  Article 67(4) of the PSD2.
384  Articles 68(4) and 68(5) of the PSD2. For details see also part 3.3.2 of this thesis. 
385  See e.g. TEIGLAND, SIRI, LARSSON, MORENO and BOGUSZ, op. cit. No. 100, pp. 28-30 and 369.
386  See e.g. ‘Where Do Banks Fit in the Fintech Stack’ (2017), Lael Brainard, Speeches of Federal Reserve Board 
Members,  available  at:  https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170428a.htm,  last 
accessed 25 August 2018.
387  Ibid.
388  See NOCTOR, op. cit. No. 302, pp. 9-11.
389  Ibid.
390  See Recital 93 of the PSD2 and Articles 65, 66, 67 and 97 thereof.
54
As was  already  mentioned  above,  AISP and  PISP  shall  have  access  to  the  payment 
accounts of their users provided that those users decide to use their services.391 However, the 
obligation of AS PSP to provide AISP and PISP with an access to payment accounts has been 
postponed in order to furnish AS PSP with time to prepare appropriate measures.392 Accordingly, 
AS PSP shall make available a testing facility to AISP and PISP from 14 March 2019, which 
will  allow AISP and PISP to  adapt  to  the  corresponding  interfaces.393 Further,  AS PSP are 
obliged  to  have  in  place  at  least  one  interface,  which  will  allow AISP and  PISP access  to 
payment accounts, no later than 14 September 2019, i.e. this date represents the date when the 
full operation of the respective measures shall arrive, and thus AISP and PISP should be entitled 
to fully access the payment accounts in order to provide their services.394
The regulators decided that screen scraping shall not be used in the future for an access to 
payment  accounts  by  AISP and PISP395,  and  thus  the  preferred  choice  is  an  access  through 
APIs.396 As a result, AS PSP may either decide to develop a dedicated interface or use an existing 
interface  that  is  used  for  authentication  and  communication  with  their  customers.397 The 
European  Commission  (together  with  an  assistance  of  the  EBA)  has  adopted  delegated 
regulation that lays down the rules concerning technical standards for communication, including 
rules focusing on interfaces for access of payment accounts.398
Some of the authors claim that the aforesaid changes will bring along improved access to 
services together with an accelerated development of services given that the banks will be forced 
391  See Articles 66 and 67 of the PSD2.
392  Articles 65, 66, 67 and 97 of the PSD2 read in conjunction with Article 115(4) thereof. The said measure is  
mentioned in the next footnote.
393  Article 30(5) of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 supplementing 
Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication OJ L 
69 read in conjunction with Article 38(3) thereof.
394  Ibid, Article 38(2).
395  See  e.g.  Explanatory  Memorandum  to  Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  No  …/..  supplementing 
Directive  2015/2366  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  with  regard  to  regulatory  technical 
standards  for  strong  customer  authentication  and  common  and  secure  open  standards  of  communication 
C/2017/7782 final, p. 3.
396  See e.g. EBA, ‘Opinion of the European Banking Authority on the implementation of the RTS on SCA and 
CSC’  (13  June  2018),  available  at: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2137845/Opinion+on+the+implementation+of+the+RTS+on+SC
A+and+CSC+%28EBA-2018-Op-04%29.pdf, last accessed 25 August 2018. 
397  See Article 31 of the Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393. It is necessary to point out that the second option  
is not the same as the screen scraping due to the fact that under the new provisions AISP and PISP will not  
access the payment accounts with user’s login and password details, but they will have to identify themselves  
with their own details. In addition, AISP and PISP have to adhere to a new set of obligations, which, inter alia, 
requires them to identify themselves towards AS PSP and communicate securely with AS PSP. See Articles 66 
and 67 of the PSD2 and the Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393, Articles 30 and 31.
398  See the Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393.
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to provide AISP and PISP with an access to their APIs.399 However, there are certain issues and 
the possible implications for banking and the Fintech industry is not as straightforward as it may 
seem at  first  glance.  These  issues  will  be  discussed  together  with  other  relevant  aspects  in 
chapter 4 of this thesis.
3.3.4.  Security measures under the PSD2
The  rapid  development  of  modern  technologies  has  also  its  reflection  in  growth  of 
electronic payments.400 The number of these payment carried out by their users was continuously 
growing and this also contributed to the advancement of new payment technologies and new 
payment  services  that  were,  however,  becoming  more  complex,  and thus  more  difficult  for 
consumers to comprehend.401 As a result, it was necessary to adopt measures that will address the 
potential issues these modern ways of electronic payments are bringing about.402
The payment service providers are therefore obliged to put in place measures that will 
prevent and mitigate potential security risks.403 These measures have to be regularly reviewed 
and  the  competent  authorities  have  to  be  informed  about  the  appropriate  measures  that  the 
payment service providers have adopted.404 In a case that a major operational or security incident 
occurs, then the competent authorities have to immediately be informed about such incidents in 
order to prevent potential damage to users of these system and prevent disruption of the whole 
payment system.405
Nevertheless, probably the most important  provision of the PSD2 concerning security 
protection can be seen in rules relating to strong customer authentication that shall apply in cases 
when  the  payer  (usually  consumer)  “accesses  its  payment  account  online”406;  “initiates  an 
electronic payment transaction”407 or “carries out any action through a remote channel which  
may imply a risk of payment fraud or other abuses”408. The PSD2 prescribes that strong customer 
authentication shall involve at least two of the following elements: (i) knowledge (something 
only the user knows, an example could be a password); (ii) possession (something only the user 
possesses, such as a payment card) and (iii) inherence (something that the user is, e.g. fingerprint 
399  See SCARDOVI, op. cit. No. 51, p. 28.
400  See Recital 7 of the PSD2.
401  Ibid.
402  See Recitals 7, 29 and 95 of the PSD2.
403  Article 95(1) of the PSD2.
404  Article 95(2) of the PSD2.
405  Article 96 of the PSD2 and Recitals 91 and 95 thereof. 
406  Article 97(1)(a) of the PSD2.
407  Article 97(1)(b) of the PSD2.
408  Article 97(1)(c) of the PSD2.
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or voice recognition).409 These elements have to be independent of each other and in case that 
one of them is breached, then the security of the others must be preserved, i.e. it must not result 
in  compromise  of  the  other  elements.410 It  is  worth  noting  that  the  obligation  to  use  strong 
customer authentication applies also the PISP.411
Therefore, we (as the customers) will be required to use strong customer authentication 
consisting of at least  two independent elements when, for example,  we decide to buy goods 
online or make electronic payments. However, the regulators are aware that the strict application 
of these rules will not be user-friendly for consumers, and therefore they are seeking to strike a 
balance  by  laying  down  a  number  of  exceptions  from  obligations  of  strong  customer 
obligation.412 These examples include,  inter alia, cases when we access online account only to 
ascertain the balance of that account or the transactions that were executed in the last 90 days413 
and initiate contactless payment at the point of sale provided that the individual amount does not 
exceed  50  EUR,  the  cumulative  amount  does  not  exceed  EUR  150  and  the  number  of 
consecutive contactless payments does not exceed five414.
Application of strong customer authentication has also consequences for potential payer’s 
liability for unauthorised payment transactions.415 In a case that strong customer authentication is 
not required by the payment service provider, then the payer shall not be held liable provided 
that the payer did not act fraudulently.416 However, it is not only the payer’s payment service 
provider that will ultimately bear loses of such unauthorised payment transaction, but payee and 
payee’s payment service provider may be required to refund the financial damage if they fail to 
accept strong customer authentication.417
In  general,  the  changes  concerning  security  measures  included  in  the  PSD2  can  be 
welcomed, as they are seeking to protect consumers and other parties from potentially harmful 
situations and, at the same time, these rules are trying to establish a safe online environment for 
payment transactions in which the consumers would be adequately protected. However, it is not 
409  See Article 4(30) of the PSD2 and STEENNOT, op. cit. 200, p. 959.
410  Article 4(30) of the PSD2.
411  Article 97(4) of the PSD2.
412  See Recitals 11 and 12 of the Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393.
413  Article 10(1) of the Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393.
414  Article 11 of the Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393.
415  Article 74 of the PSD2.
416  Article 74(2) of the PSD2.
417  See Article 74(2) of the PSD2 and STEENNOT, op. cit. 200, p. 961.
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possible to fully assess whether the rules will bring the desired impacts given that most of these 
rules will be fully applicable from 14 September 2019.418
3.3.5.  Enhanced consumer protection
Together with other goals that the PSD2 is trying to achieve, the PSD2 aims to put in 
place a set of rules that would clarify the position of consumers and enhance their protection.419 
The PSD2 follows the principle of a different level of protection of consumers and undertakings 
that was established in the PSD, which allows persons other than consumers to agree that certain 
provisions of the PSD2 shall not apply to them and their respective agreements.420 It is important 
to stress that most of the provisions governing transparency and information requirements and 
rights and obligations of the payment service users remained almost identical421, and thus the 
following lines will only address the most important changes in favour of the consumers.
Some of the important changes were already mentioned in parts  3.3.1 to  3.3.4 of this 
thesis,  since  revised  security  measures,  broader  scope  of  the  PSD2  and  regulation  of  new 
payment service providers also contribute to the overall protection of consumers. As a result, the 
main changes presented in this chapter will concern limitation of the amount for unauthorised 
payments paid by consumers, surcharges and complaints procedure. 
As regards the amount of losses for unauthorised payment transactions that the payer 
must bear, this amount has been lowered from EUR 150 to EUR 50422, which is deemed to be an 
adequate amount that ensures high-level of consumer protection.423 Moreover, the PSD2 clarified 
the rules relating to situations in which the payer shall bear all the losses incurred in connection 
with  unauthorised  payment  transactions  since  the  concept  of  gross  negligence  was  not 
interpreted uniformly by the Member States.424 Accordingly, the occasions of gross negligence 
shall cover situations involving a significant degree of carelessness, such as keeping a note with 
PIN  together  with  the  credit  card.425 Furthermore,  the  payers  are  protected  from  potential 
unauthorised  payments  by Article  75 of the PSD2 which provides that  the payer’s  payment 
418  This mostly concerns the general rules focusing on security measures for the application of strong consumer  
authentication and exemptions from the obligation to apply strong customer authentication. For details see 
Article 38(2) of the Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393.
419  For details see parts 3.3.4 and 3.3 of this thesis.
420  See e.g. Recital 53 of the PSD2 and Articles 38 and 61 thereof.
421  Compare Title III, Articles 38-60 and Title IV, Articles 61-103 of the PSD2 with Title III, Articles 30-50 and  
Title IV, Articles 51-83 of the PSD.
422  Compare Article 74(1) of the PSD2 with Article 61(1) of the PSD.
423  See Recital 71 of the PSD2.
424  Compare Articles  74-77 of  the PSD2 with Article  61-63 of  the PSD. For details  regarding  the different 
interpretation see e.g. MEULEN, Nicole Vander. ‘You’ve been warned: Consumer liability in Internet banking 
fraud’ (2013) Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 29, issue 6, pp. 713-718.
425  See Recital 72 of the PSD2.
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service provider may block funds in cases where the transaction amount is not known in advance 
only if the payer gives its consent to the total amount of funds that shall be blocked.426 This 
provision shall cover payment transaction such as hotel reservations and those under car rental 
agreements.427 
Furthermore,  the  PSD2  addresses  the  issues  connected  with  the  practices  known  as 
surcharging, i.e. charges for use of certain payment instruments.428 In this respect, it is important 
to note that PSD2 was adopted together with Regulation (EU) 2015/751429 that lays down limits 
for  interchange  fess  connected  with  card-based  payment  transactions.  These  provisions  are 
supplemented by the PSD2 which explicitly prohibits any surcharges for the use of payment 
instruments that are covered by the said regulation.430
Finally,  the  provisions  regarding  complains  procedure,  which  can  resolve  the  issues 
before these issues are referred to alternative dispute resolutions procedure or to the courts431, 
together with the respective competent authorities authorised to resolve these complains have 
been amended.432 The process concerning complains procedure has been clarified and the EBA 
adopted guidelines that specify certain outstanding issues, such as information that should be 
included in the complaint and in the subsequent response to the complaint, channels that should 
be  used  to  submit  complaints  and  the  obligation  of  the  respective  competent  authorities  to 
monitor and document these complaints.433
3.3.6.  The role of the EBA
The  last  of  the  important  changes,  which  are  coming  along  with  the  PSD2,  is  the 
strengthening  of  the  position  of  the  EBA given  that  the  EBA is  considered  to  possess  the 
expertise  required  for  preparation  of  guidelines  and  regulatory  technical  standard  that  will 
supplement PSD2.434 Pursuant to the PSD2, the EBA has been empowered to develop twelve 
426  See Article 75(1) of the PSD2, which was not included in the PSD.
427  See Recital 75 of the PSD2. 
428  See Recital  66 of the PSD2. For details  regarding surcharging see e.g.  ‘Review of the Payment Services 
Directive:  The  question  of  surcharges’  (2011),  ECRI  Policy  Brief  No.  5.,  available  at: 
http://aei.pitt.edu/32634/1/ECRI_PB_No_5_Pyykko_on_the_PSD.pdf, last accessed 25 August 2018.
429  See the Regulation, op. cit. No. 175.
430  See Article 62(4) of the PSD2. See also part 3.1 of this thesis.
431  See Recital 98 of the PSD2.
432  Compare Articles 99-103 of the PSD2 with Articles 80-83 of the PSD.
433  The  guidelines  were  adopted  in  accordance  with  Article  100(6)  of  the  PSD2.  See  EBA,  ‘Final  Report:  
Guidelines on procedures for complaints of alleged infringements of Directive (EU) 2015/2366’ (13 October 
2017),  available  at: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1989045/Final+Guidelines+on+complaint+procedures+under+P
SD2+%28EBA-GL-2017-13%29.pdf, last accessed 25 August 2018.
434  See Recitals 107 and 108 of the PSD2.
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documents, which consist of regulatory technical standards and guidelines.435 These documents 
are crucial for proper functioning of the provisions of the PSD2 since not all of the measures 
could have been regulated in the PSD2. What is more, the possibility to review and subsequently 
amend the guidelines offers the EBA with an opportunity to promptly react to new developments 
in this area. 
The guidelines  adopted by the EBA includes  measures  that  specify provisions of the 
PSD2,  such  as  guidelines  on  fraud  reporting436,  security  measures437 and  authorisation  and 
registration438.  What  is  more,  the EBA is  authorised  to  issue opinions  that  can contribute  to 
uniform  application  of  the  PSD2.439 As  an  example,  the  EBA  issued  opinion  on  the 
implementation  of  the  RTS  on  SCA  and  CSC440 that  interprets  unclear  provisions  of  the 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389441. 
In this respect, one of the essential  opinions issued by the EBA is the opinion on the 
transition  from  PSD1  to  PSD2442.  This  opinion  provides  the  competent  authorities  with 
information  concerning  the  transition  and instructions  how to  handle  the  re-authorisation  of 
existing payment institutions and how to treat PISP and AISP during the transition period.443 
Given that the provisions regarding strong customer authentication and common standards for 
communication  and  APIs  will  apply  fully  from 14  September  2019,  the  EBA instructs  the 
competent authorities to allow the existing methods of screen scraping to be used by AISP and 
PISP,  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  EBA instructs  the  competent  authorities  not  to  use  the 
435  See EBA, ‘Opinion of the European Banking Authority on the transition from PSD1 to PSD2’ (19 December 
2017),  available  at: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2067703/EBA+Opinion+on+the+transition+from+PSD1+to+PS
D2+%28EBA-Op-2017-16%29.pdf, last accessed 25 August 2018.
436  See EBA, ‘Final Report: Guidelines on fraud reporting under the Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2)’ (18  
July  2018),  available  at: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2281937/Guidelines+on+fraud+reporting+under+Article+96%28
6%29%20PSD2+%28EBA-GL-2018-05%29.pdf/5653b876-90c9-476f-9f44-507f5f3e0a1e,  last  accessed  25 
August 2018.
437  See EBA, ‘Final Report: Guidelines on the security measures for operational and security risks of payment 
services  under  Directive  (EU)  2015/2366  (PSD2)’  (12  December  2017),  available  at:  
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2060117/Final+report+on+EBA+Guidelines+on+the+security+m
easures+for+operational+and+security+risks+under+PSD2+%28EBA-GL-2017-17%29.pdf,  last  accessed  25 
August 2018.
438  See EBA, ‘Final Report on the EBA Guidelines under Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (PSD2) on the information to 
be provided for the authorisation of payment institutions and e-money institutions and for the registration of  
account  information  service  providers’  (11  July  2017),  available  at: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1904583/Final+Guidelines+on+Authorisations+of+Payment+Ins
titutions+%28EBA-GL-2017-09%29.pdf/f0e94433-f59b-4c24-9cec-2d6a2277b62c,  last  accessed  25  August 
2018.
439  See footnote No. 43 above.
440  See the Opinion, op. cit. No. 396.
441  See the Commission Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393.
442  See the Opinion, op. cit. No. 435.
443  Ibid, pp. 5-6
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provisions stipulating obligations of AISP and PISP to identify themselves and communicate 
securely with AS PSP during the transition period.444
As  a  result,  the  guidelines  and  opinions  issued  by  the  EBA can  be  seen  as  crucial 
measures for the future development and unification of the different practice approaches between 
the Member States and their respective competent authorities. Even though these opinions issued 
by the EBA may be not entirely binding on the competent authorities, they may help to unify the 
practice by their persuasiveness.445 
In the following chapter, the differences between the PSD and PSD2 will be evaluated 
together with the possible effects the changes coming along with the PSD2 may have on banking 
and the Fintech industry.
444  Ibid, pp. 6-7
445  See Article 29(1) of the Regulation, op. cit. No. 34.
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4. Revolution or gradual  evolution for  the  Fintech Industry and bright 
prospects?
The main aim of this chapter is to present arguments that would answer the question 
posed in the title of this chapter. For that reason, the first part of this chapter will evaluate the 
impacts that the PSD2 may have on banking and the Fintech industry (4.1). Subsequently, the 
second part is going to discuss additional factors that may tip the scales or hinder the further 
advancement of the Fintech industry (4.2). 
4.1. Assessment of the changes coming along with the PSD2 for the whole 
banking and Fintech industry
Part 3.3 of this thesis presented a considerable number of amendments to the PSD that are 
included  in  the  revised  directive,  i.e.  in  the  PSD2.  While  many  of  these  changes  will  be 
beneficial for consumers and will provide them with a greater security and overall protection, not 
all of them will have significant effects on banking. Accordingly, three of the presented changes 
may  cause  disruption  to  the  banking  system as  we know it,  namely  AISP,  PISP and  most 
importantly the obligation of AS PSP (mostly banks) to open their accounts.
Until now, the banks were not obliged to provide access to payment accounts to third 
parties via APIs or through other comparable interfaces.446 As a result,  providers of services, 
such as AISP and PISP, had to access payment accounts through other methods including screen 
scraping, which is not considered to be secure or user-friendly.447 As of 14 March 2019, banks 
and other financial institutions that fall under the definition of AS PSP will have to provide AISP 
and PISP with an access to a testing facility and this access will be followed by a full access to 
payment accounts on 14 September 2019.448 Subsequently, customers and other service providers 
with an access from the customers will gain the access to a bulk of data regarding their accounts 
that  could  be  used  for  price  comparison  and  other  purposes.449 Banks  and  other  financial 
institutions will not be able to hinder access to these data that were once stubbornly protected 
from other market participants.450
446  See e.g. NOCTOR, op. cit. No. 302, p. 9.
447  Ibid.
448  See Article 38 of the Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393. See also part 3.3.3 of this thesis.
449  See SCARDOVI, op. cit. No. 51, pp. 22-23.
450  Ibid.
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Migration to APIs will also enable the developers to build on existing interfaces, and 
therefore  they  will  not  have  to  start  from a scratch  when developing their  software.451 It  is 
expected that the PSD2 and the shift to APIs will help to resolve the existing problems with non-
uniform interfaces among the market.452
At the same time, the PSD2 provided AISP and PISP with a seat at the table by granting 
them appropriate access to the market.453 The PSD2 explicitly stipulates that various payment 
institutions  shall  have access  to  payment  accounts  on “an objective,  non-discriminatory and  
proportionate basis”454. As a result, AISP and PISP will gain an access to payment accounts and 
they will have the opportunity to provide their services within the whole EU on condition that 
they fulfil requirements for passporting.455
Cortet, Rijks and Nijland have presented four viable options how the banks can adapt to 
the PSD2 and obligations included therein.456 These options are: comply; compete; expand and 
transform.457 The  first  option  anticipates  only  bare  minimum:  banks  will  comply  with  the 
obligations  stipulated  in  the  PSD2  and  they  will  provide  their  services  as  if  nothing  has 
changed.458 The  second  option  requires  more  effort  from the  banks  since  they  will  have  to 
employ  more  offensive  strategy  by  offering  innovative  products,  while  relying  on  their 
established client base and procedures.459 Further, the banks may seize the opportunity and go 
beyond their usual scope and established services, which would be the third option that includes 
expansion beyond their traditional reach.460 Finally, the option of transformation incorporates the 
previous  options  and expects  banks to  reach beyond their  ordinary scope and establish new 
partnership agreements with Fintech companies that will help them to evolve.461
Even though the presented options include many other factors that must be taken into 
account, it is highly likely that the banks are well aware of the risks and potential opportunities 
that  are  coming  along  with  the  PSD2.  While  it  is  not  possible  to  generalize  and  make 
assumptions about all the banks, it could be expected that the banks will try to benefit from the 
opportunities that are stemming from adoption of the PSD2. 
451  See e.g. NOCTOR, op. cit. No. 302, pp. 9-10.
452  ‘Regulatory sandbox lessons learned report’, op. cit. No. 150, pp. 17-18.
453  See Recital 67 of the PSD2.
454  See Article 36 of the PSD2. See also Recitals 33, 39, 50 of the PSD2. 
455  See Article 28 of the PSD2.
456  See CORTET, RIJKS and NIJLAND, op. cit. No. 155, p. 21.






In conclusion, the PSD2 should be considered as an important directive that is not a mere 
“upgrade” of the previous directive with a few minor amendments. The regulators leapt forward 
and laid down provisions that  can change the current  situation and relationship between the 
banks and the Fintech companies. However, the regulators should not be overly satisfied since 
the PSD2 can be seen only as a piece of the puzzle.462 Therefore, it is important to see the whole 
picture including other related areas, such as crypto-currencies and the possible issues that are 
connected with the development of these currencies.463
Nevertheless,  the  provided  analysis  mostly  focused  on  the  differences  between  the 
wording of the PSD and the PSD2 and the possible impacts these changes may bring about. 
Therefore, the following part of this thesis will briefly mention some of the factors that must be 
taken into account when assessing possible implications of the PSD2.
4.2. Is there a bright future for the Fintech Industry?
At the outset of this part, it is worth noting that the PSD2 has not been fully transposed by 
all the Member States. As of the day of completion of this thesis, there are still four Member 
States that have not transposed the PSD2 into their national law, namely Spain, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Romania.464 Even though the EBA emphasized that the delayed transposition shall 
not have effect on authorisation, registration or passporting of PISP and AISP465, this may have 
negative effects on possibility of entities to fully benefit from the rights conferred by the PSD2. 
As a result, it would be beneficial for all the stakeholders to remedy this situation and implement 
the PSD2 by the Member States that have not yet transposed the PSD2 into their national law as 
soon as possible.
As was already mentioned in part 3.3.6 of this thesis, the EBA has been mandated by the 
PSD2 to deliver twelve deliverables, which are crucial for proper functioning of the payment 
services system under the PSD2. Nevertheless, the EBA managed to complete ten out of these 
twelve deliverables before the transposition deadline of the PSD2, but some of these deliverables 
included postponed date of entry into force.466 Even though the EBA has already completed the 
remaining  two  deliverables467,  the  delays  with  adoption  of  these  supplementary  measures 
together with the postponed date of entry into force of some of the measures have precluded the 
462  See ROMĀNOVA, GRIMA and SPITERI, op. cit. No. 113, pp. 19-20.
463  See MASCHEK, op. cit No. 113, p. 6.
464  See  the  details  regarding  national  transposition  of  the  PSD2  at  the  website  “EUR-Lex”,  available  at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32015L2366, last accessed 25 August 2018.
465  See the Opinion, op. cit. No. 435, pp. 10-11.
466  See the Opinion, op. cit. No. 435, p. 1. As regards the postponed date of entry into force, see e.g. Article 38 of 
the Delegated Regulation, op. cit. No. 393
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full  applicability  of  the  PSD2  from  the  transposition  deadline  and  did  not  provide  market 
participants  with enough time to prepare for the changes coming along with all  the adopted 
measures.  What  is  more,  the  EBA  shall  develop,  operate  and  maintain  the  EBA  register 
containing aggregated information regarding authorised and registered payment institutions in 
the respective Member States, but the register has not yet been launched.468 
Another issue can be seen in different approaches of the competent authorities which is 
not  uniform amongst  the  Member  States.  The  UK’s  competent  authority,  i.e.  the  Financial 
Conduct Authority, is considered to be a proactive regulator that is supporting competition by 
various activities that it engages in, such as regulatory sandboxes.469 This approach apparently 
contributed to the seemingly smooth migration from the PSD to PSD2 that resulted in the current 
situation in which the register of PISP and AISP in the UK contains already forty-one entities 
that have been authorised or registered to carry out activities of payment initiation servicers or 
account information services (or both, as the case may be).470 On the other hand, the adaptation 
to the PSD2 has not been entirely smooth in all the Member States. One of the examples can be 
the Czech Republic in which three Czech Fintech companies471 have applied for authorisation or 
registration as either PISP or AISP (one of them as early as in January), but none of them has 
obtained the requested authorisation or registration.472 One of the main arguments for rejection of 
these applications was the missing insurance, which was not, however, offered by the insurance 
companies  operating  in  the  Czech  Republic  at  the  time  of  rejection.473 As  a  result,  these 
467  These  two missing deliverables  were  the Guidelines  on fraud  reporting,  op.  cit.  No.  436,  and the Draft  
Regulatory Technical Standard on cooperation between competent authorities, see EBA, ‘Final Report: Draft  
Regulatory Technical  Standards on cooperation between competent  authorities  in  home and host  Member 
States  in  the supervision of payment  institutions operating on a cross-border  basis under Article  29(6)  of  
PSD2’  (31  July  2018),  available  at: 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2298183/Draft+RTS+on+home-host+cooperation+under+PSD2+
%28EBA-RTS-2018-03%29.pdf, last accessed 25 August 2018. 
468  See Article 15(1) of the PSD2 read in conjunction with Article 14(1) thereof. For details regarding the EBA 
register see also the official websites of the EBA, available at:  http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-
data/register-of-payment-and-e-money-institutions-under-
psd2;jsessionid=8971807C28A97D1C09B251E1FBBC8CCC, last accessed 25 August 2018.
469  See  e.g.  SCARDOVI,  op.  cit.  No.  51,  pp.  156-157,  and  TEIGLAND,  SIRI,  LARSSON, MORENO and 
BOGUSZ, op. cit. No. 100, pp. 74-75. For details regarding regulatory sandbox see part 2.2.3 of this thesis.
470  See ‘The Financial Service Register’, Account Information & Payment Initiation Service Providers, available  
at  https://register.fca.org.uk/shpo_searchresultspage?preDefined=AIPISP&TOKEN=3wq1nht7eg7tr,  last 
accessed 25 August 2018. Please note that even though the register contains fifty-one entries, some of the  
entities are entitled to carry out both payment initiation services or account information services, and thus the  
total number of entities is currently forty-one. 
471  These Fintech companies include: BudgetBakers, Roger and Spendee, see ‘ČNB zatím bankovní trh fintechům 
neotevřela.  Požaduje  specifické  pojištění  pro  novou  službu’,  E15,  available  at: 
https://www.e15.cz/byznys/finance-a-bankovnictvi/cnb-zatim-bankovni-trh-fintechum-neotevrela-pozaduje-
specificke-pojisteni-pro-novou-sluzbu-1348544, last accessed 25 August 2018.
472  Ibid. See also the official registered of the Czech National Bank that does not contain any PISP or AISP. 




companies cannot legally provide their services within the EU since they have not obtained the 
necessary authorisation or registration. It should be noted that the main point of this observation 
is not a criticism of the Czech National Bank, but this comment is rather trying to point out that  
the active approach of the competent authorities may contribute to the smooth functioning of the 
market and the development of the Fintech companies. 
One of the advantages of banks is that almost everyone has a bank account and banks 
have been able to gain the trust of their clients, which may consider them as robust companies 
capable of protecting their savings.474 Consequently, they may prefer an established company 
over start-ups that are not established within the market, such as the Fintech companies. At the 
same time, it is difficult for the Fintech companies to compete with banks that have massive 
resources compared to the resources available to certain start-ups. Banks are well aware of the 
potential threats that are coming along with the expansion of the Fintech industry, and therefore 
they invest in new technologies, such as JPMorgan Chase that invested over USD 9.5 billion in 
technological innovations in 2016.475
However, the aforesaid may not be true for everyone since some people may rather use a 
novel application for management of their finances offered by the Fintech company than use the 
services of the banks. Further, the reputation of the banks has been substantially damaged in the 
aftermath of the Global financial crisis, which may contribute to the willingness of consumers to 
give Fintech companies a chance in order to prove that they may be reliable.476 Moreover, the 
Fintech companies cannot be considered only as start-up companies in view of the fact that some 
of these companies have already obtained banking licences and gathered investments, such as the 
Fintech  company (or  rather  the digital  bank)  Monzo with  expected  valuation  over  GBP 1.5 
billion and Transferwise, the platform for money transfers, valuated at USD 1.6 billion.477
What is more, the competition between banks and the Fintech companies may become 
even tougher with an entry of new competitors that were originally technological companies, 
including companies such as Google,  Amazon and Facebook, which are expanding into new 
markets.478 Unlike the Fintech companies, these technological companies, which are sometimes 
called “Techfin companies”, have their customer base already established and they have enough 
474  See CORTET, RIJKS and NIJLAND, op. cit. No. 155, p. 21.
475  See ‘Financial technology is proving less of a battleground than feared’ (2017), The Economist, available at:  
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2017/05/06/financial-technology-is-proving-less-of-a-battleground-
than-feared, last accessed 25 August 2018.
476  For details see part 2.1.3 of this thesis.
477  See  ‘Monzo  poised  to  join  ranks  of  Europe’s  fintech  ‘unicorns’’  (17  August  2018),  available  at:  
https://www.ft.com/content/ef54082c-a16a-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4, last accessed 25 August 2018.
478  See CORTET, RIJKS and NIJLAND, op. cit. No. 155, p. 20.
66
capital  funds  for  their  investments.479 Furthermore,  Amazon  already  started  its  own lending 
platform and it offers credit cards to their customers, while the other companies are expected to 
follow shortly.480 Therefore, the banking system is not threatened only by the Fintech industry, 
but also by these other competitors that are eager to enter the market.
The above-mentioned considerations represent only a few of the factors that have to be 
taken into account when accessing the possible implications that the PSD2 may bring to the 
financial market. The PSD2 is one of the factors that may contribute to the transformation of the 
market, but we must be aware of the fact that many (if not all) of the changes coming along with  
modern technologies are not entirely dependent on the regulation. As a result, the market may 
move in other direction than expected and the expected new players, such as PISP and AISP, 
may not even be the main actors. That being said, we can expect that the Fintech companies will  
play an important role in the further development of the market with financial services. 
In the light of the above, it can be concluded that the PSD2 represents rather a gradual 
evolution than a revolution. The PSD2 brings about many important changes, but many of these 
changes  stem from the  analysis  of  the  PSD  provided  by  the  various  stakeholders  over  the 
previous years. Further, it was pointed out that there many additional factors which have to be 
taken into account when assessing the possible implications of the PSD2. Some of these factors, 
such  as  the  non-existence  of  transposition  measures  in  four  of  the  Member  States,  delayed 
adoption of the supplementary measures to the PSD2 and different approaches of the competent 
authorities, support the argument that the PSD2 has not yet caused a revolution in the payment 
systems. Nevertheless, this thesis pointed out that some of the desired effects of the PSD2 may 
arise after the moment when all the supplementary measures come into effect and that there are 
other factors which may contribute to the development of the Fintech industry.
479  Ibid. See also ‘Fintech won’t be the end of the big banks. Tech-fin might be’ (17 January 2018), Capgemini 
Consulting,  available  at:  https://www.capgemini.com/consulting/2018/01/fintech-wont-be-the-end-of-the-big-




Based on the provided analysis and examination of the PSD2, the author of this thesis 
concludes  that  the  PSD2  is  important  measure  incorporating  many  changes  to  the  current 
payment services framework at the EU level, which may contribute to the development of the 
Fintech industry. Even though the Fintech industry and the respective Fintech companies are 
rapidly growing both in size and numbers, it is submitted that the Fintech industry will not fully 
replace the banks. However, the Fintech companies  have already gained market share in the 
recent years and, as a result, banks were forced to (re)consider their position in the market with 
financial services and evaluate the future prospects in this industry. These events together with 
the rapid growth of modern technology and tightened regulation of banking system in the wake 
of the Global financial crisis have caused banks to amend their business strategy and respond to 
the new challenges. 
In order to provide an answer to the question posed at the beginning of this thesis, i.e. to 
answer whether adoption of the PSD2 combined with other novelties (including Fintech) are 
capable  of  disrupting  the  current  banking  system,  it  was  first  necessary  to  analyse  the 
development  of  the  banking  system and  the  Fintech  industry  together  with  their  respective 
regulations.
First of all, it was submitted that the banking system is heavily regulated industry, which 
is also attributable to the Global financial crisis. From the provided analysis it became apparent 
that many measures have been adopted at the EU level as a response to the Global financial crisis 
with the aim to prevent similar financial crisis. These measures focused on provisions relating to 
capital  requirements  (the  CRD  IV  and  the  CRR),  bank  resolution  and  recovery  (SRMR 
Regulation and BRRD) and financial  instruments (EMIR Regulation, MiFID II Directive and 
MiFIR Regulation). As a result, the banking system can be considered to be heavily regulated 
both at the EU level and at the national level, which precludes banks to be as flexible as the 
Fintech companies that often make (or used to make) use of the regulatory gaps, and thus do 
(did) not have to adhere to the same obligations as banks.
Subsequently,  the  thesis  argued  that  the  Global  financial  crisis,  during  which  banks 
suffered large financial losses, contributed to the rapid development of the Fintech industry in 
the years following the crisis. This argument was supported by the opinion of the wide public 
which considers  the banks and especially  the bankers  to  be the  main culprits  of  the Global 
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financial crisis. As a result, the bank's reputation has been seriously damaged, which provided 
the Fintech industry with an opportunity to take advantage of this fact to support its growth. 
The analysis indicated that the Fintech companies are currently regulated based on their 
activities, which means that the level of regulation varies from no regulation at the EU level to 
heavy regulation.  Furthermore,  the  thesis  discussed  the  different  approaches  of  the  Member 
States towards the Fintech industry and it indicated that some of the Member States are willing 
to provide the Fintech companies with certain measures enabling them to further develop. This 
was supported by one of the analysed approaches that consist in "regulatory sandboxes", which 
provide the Fintech companies with a unique opportunity to put their services to the test in a safe 
environment  under  the  supervision  of  the  regulators.  Consequently,  it  was  submitted  that  a 
reasonable regulation of the Fintech industry is required in order to protect all the stakeholders 
and, at the same time, to provide these companies with the possibility to grow.
After  the  sections  discussing  regulation  of  banking  and  the  Fintech  industry,  it  was 
crucial  to  examine the  current  regulation  of  the payment  systems under  EU law,  which can 
hinder or contribute to the possible development of the Fintech industry. The thesis asserted that 
the situation concerning regulation of the payment systems at  the EU level has changed and 
developed over the years. Subsequently, this argument was supported with the analysis of the 
development at the EU level from which it became apparent that the regulatory framework has 
gradually  developed  from no  regulation  at  the  EU  level  to  the  current  situation  when  this 
regulatory framework is predominately made up by regulations and full harmonisation directive, 
which contribute to the uniform development of the regulation. 
Even  though  it  was  submitted  that  the  PSD  contributed  to  the  development  of  the 
payment systems at the EU level, the thesis presented several issues that were identified during 
the assessment of the effects of the PSD, such as the scope and exclusions from the scope of the 
PSD and new market participants that were not covered by the PSD, which resulted in adoption 
of the PSD2. 
Further, the thesis presented the main changes coming along with adoption of the PSD2 
and argued that not all the changes can be considered as a step in the right direction. One of the 
insufficient  amendments  of  the  PSD  included  in  the  PSD2  can  be  seen  in  the  scope  and 
exclusions from the scope of the PSD2. While it was concluded that clarifications of the scope 
and exclusions from the scope are welcomed, it was noted that the PSD2 still contains many 
options of the Member States or their competent authorities to derogate from the provisions of 
the PSD2. Therefore, it would be appropriate to reduce the number of these options in the future,  
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which would ensure unified application between the Member States. One of the options would 
be to adopt a regulation instead of a full harmonisation directive.
The second important change included in the PSD2, and arguably the most important, 
covers two new payment service providers (AISP and PISP) together with the obligations of the 
AS PSP (mostly  banks)  to  provide these  two new service  providers  with an access  to  their 
payment  accounts  if  AISP and PISP provide  services  to  the  users  (owners)  of  the  payment 
accounts. Although these payment service providers may provide the Fintech companies with an 
opportunity  to  further  penetrate  the  market,  the  thesis  demonstrated  that  this  has  not  yet 
materialized  due  to  various  reasons.  The  thesis  presented  that  the  main  obstacles  include 
postponed date of entry into force of the crucial measure (i.e. the full operation of the respective 
measures  shall  arrive  on  14  September  2019),  inconsistent  approaches  of  the  competent 
authorities  and delayed transposition of the PSD2 into national  law in some of the Member 
States.
In general, the thesis argued that the PSD2 can be seen as a step in the right direction  
given that the PSD2 is not a mere revision of the original payment  services directive,  but it 
appropriately  responds to the  new developments  in  modern technology.  However,  the thesis 
identified several issues connected with adoption of the PSD2 and pointed out that not all of the 
measures and possibilities connected with the PSD2 are fully applicable.
As a result, it is not possible to fully assess all the implications connected with adoption 
of the PSD2. That being said, the findings of this thesis indicate that the PSD2 is not capable of 
disruption  of  the  banking system as  we know it.  The  Fintech  industry  may profit  from the 
changes coming along with the PSD2, but banks have enough time to prepare for these changes. 
As a result, banks will be definitely affected by the modified rules included in the revised PSD2, 
but they are already taking steps in order to adopt to this situation. Accordingly, it remains to be 
seen  whether  the  PSD2 will  meet  the  objectives  that  it  envisaged  and  whether  the  Fintech 
industry will make use of the provisions of the PSD2 to their full potential. 
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List of abbreviations / Seznam zkratek 
AISP Account Information Service Providers
API Application Programme Interface
AS PSP Account Servicing Payment Service Providers
BRRD Directive 2014/59/EU
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
CRD IV Directive 2013/36/EU
CRR Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
EEA European Economic Area
EMIR Regulation Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012
EU European Union (for the purpose of this thesis, EU shall also 
mean European Community)
EUR Euro
FCA UK Financial Conduct Authority
Fintech Financial Technology as defined in part 2.2
GBP Great British Pound
GDPR Regulation (EU) 2016/679
Global financial crisis The  Global  financial  crisis  of  2007-2008  as  defined  in  part 
2.1.2
PISP Payment Initiation Service Providers
PSD Directive 2007/64/EC 
PSD2 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 
MiFID II Directive Directive 2014/65/EU
MiFIR Regulation Regulation (EU) No 600/2014
OTC Over-the-counter derivatives
TEC Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the functioning of the European Union
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SRMR Regulation Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014
Member States Member States of the European Union
USA United States of America
USD United States Dollar
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PSD2: Dopady na bankovní a fintech sektor
Abstrakt (ČJ)
Hlavním cílem této diplomové práce je kriticky zhodnotit  možné dopady zrevidované 
směrnice o platebních službách (PSD2) na bankovní a fintech sektor. Z toho důvodu se práce 
nejdříve zaměřuje na současný bankovní systém společně s aktuálními problémy souvisejícími s 
globální finanční krizí z let 2007 a 2008, které vedly ke značným změnám regulace bankovního 
systému na evropské úrovni. Práce následně srovnává bankovní systém s rostoucím sektorem 
finančních  technologií  (Fintech)  a  poskytuje  přehled  tohoto  sektoru  společně  s  příslušnou 
regulací. Po přehledu pojednávajícím o bankovnictví a fintech sektoru následuje analýza původní 
směrnice  o  platebních  službách  (PSD) a  PSD2,  která  rovněž  obsahuje  příslušnou judikaturu 
Soudního  dvora  Evropské  unie.  Poslední  část  práce  hodnotí  možné  dopady  PSD2,  přičemž 
zohledňuje další významné prvky, které mohou ovlivnit možný rozvoj fintech sektoru.
Z příslušné analýzy vyplývá, že regulace bankovního systému na evropské úrovni byla 
posílena  v  návaznosti  na  globální  finanční  krizi  s  ohledem  na  to,  že  nedostatečná  regulace 
bankovnictví  byla  jedním  z  hlavních  příčin  vzniku  globální  finanční  krize.  V  práci  je  dále 
argumentováno, že překotný vývoj moderních technologií společně s následky globální finanční 
krize pro bankovnictví přispěly k rozvoji fintech sektoru. Práce poukazuje na fakt, že fintech 
sektor nebyl tak značně regulován, přičemž tato situace se již změnila.
V práci jsou dále srovnávána příslušná ustanovení PSD a PSD2 společně s následným 
představením  hlavních  změn,  které  přichází  v  návaznosti  na  přijetí  PSD2.  Tato  práce  dále 
argumentuje, že hlavní změny mohou být spatřovány v pozměněné oblasti působnosti směrnice, 
přijetí  dvou  nových  poskytovatelů  platebních  služeb,  a  to  konkrétně  poskytovatelů  služeb 
iniciování  platby  a  služeb informování  o  účtu,  dále  v opatřeních  týkajících  se bezpečnosti  a 
posílení ochrany spotřebitelů.
Závěrečná  část  práce  argumentuje,  že  PSD2  společně  se  změnami,  které  přichází  s 
přijetím této směrnice, mohou být považovány za krok správným směrem. Zároveň je ale nutné 
vzít  v  potaz  další  relevantní  faktory.  V  souladu  s  tím  představuje  práce  některé  z  těchto 
relevantních faktorů, a to konkrétně pozdní provedení této směrnice několika členskými státy 
Evropské  unie,  rozdílné  přístupy  příslušných  orgánů  a  novou  konkurenci.  Ačkoliv  práce 
předestírá,  že  směrnice  PSD2  může  přispět  k  dalšímu  rozvoji  fintech  sektoru,  zároveň  je 
připuštěno, že je pravděpodobně velmi brzy na to, aby mohly být zhodnoceny všechny možné 
dopady této směrnice. 
Klíčová slova: PSD2, Fintech, bankovnictví, platební služby
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PSD2: The Implications for Banking and the Fintech Industry
Abstract (EN)
The main aim of this diploma thesis is to critically assess the implications of the revised 
Directive on Payment Services (PSD2) for Banking and the Fintech Industry. In order to do so, 
the  thesis  firstly  focuses  on  the  current  banking  system  together  with  the  recent  problems 
associated with the Global financial crisis of 2007-2008, which have given rise to substantial 
changes of the regulation of banking system at the EU level. Subsequently, the thesis compares 
the  banking  system with  the  rising  financial  technology  (Fintech)  industry  and  provides  an 
overview of this industry together with regulation thereof. The provided overview of Banking 
and  the  Fintech  Industry  is  followed  by  the  analysis  of  the  original  Directive  on  Payment 
Services (PSD) and the PSD2, which also includes relevant case-law of the CJEU. Finally, the 
last part of the thesis assesses the possible implications of the PSD2, while it takes into account 
other relevant factors that may affect the potential development of the Fintech Industry.
From the  respective  analysis  it  becomes  apparent  that  the  regulation  of  the  banking 
system at the EU level has been strengthened in response to the Global financial crisis given that 
the insufficient regulation of banking was one of the main causes of the Global financial crisis.  
Subsequently, it is argued that the rapid development of modern technology together with the 
consequences of the Global financial crisis on banking contributed to the growth of the Fintech 
Industry. The thesis notes that the Fintech industry was not heavily regulated, but the situation 
has changed. 
Further,  the  thesis  compares  the  provisions  of  the  PSD and  PSD2 and  subsequently 
presents the main changes coming along with adoption of the PSD2. The thesis contends that the 
main changes can be seen in the amended scope of the directive, two new service providers, i.e.  
Payment  Initiation  Service  Providers  and  Account  Information  Service  Providers,  security 
measures and enhanced consumer protection.
In the last part, the thesis argues that the PSD2 and the changes coming along with its  
adoption  should  be  considered  as  a  step  in  the  right  direction,  but,  at  the  same time,  other 
relevant factors must be considered. Accordingly, the thesis presents some of the factors, such as 
late transposition in the EU member states, different approaches of the competent authorities and 
new  competitors.  While  the  thesis  contends  that  the  PSD2  can  contribute  to  the  further 
development of the Fintech Industry, it concedes that it is probably too early to assess all the 
possible implications.
Key words: PSD2, Fintech, Banking, payment services
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